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Chapter 1: Introduction and overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Privacy is a right that is protected in terms of the common law and s 14 of Chapter 21 of 
the Constitution.2 The Constitution recognises the right to privacy as an intrinsic and 
fundamental human right. This provides an indication of its importance.3 
 
The right to privacy as enshrined in the Constitution4 includes 'informational privacy',5 
which can be described as a person’s right to control and decide when, how, and under 
what circumstances their personal information may be disclosed to the public.6 Data 
protection is an important aspect of safeguarding a person's right to privacy.7  
 
The common law right to privacy in South Africa was recognised in the case of O'Keefe 
v Argus Printing8 wherein the court held that the right to dignity includes the right to 
privacy.9 This was the first time that South African courts recognised the right to 
privacy as an independent personality right. The Constitutional Court in Bernstein & 
others v Bester10 later endorsed this recognition and Ackerman J held that privacy 
relates only to a person's truly personal aspects and not to every aspect within his or her 
personal knowledge and experience.11  
 
The judgment in Bernstein faced criticism from academics in South Africa. Neethling12 
argues that the restrictive interpretation of privacy by Ackerman J fails to take into 
                                         
1 Chapter 2 of the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 ("Constitution"). 
3 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 109 (Project 124) Privacy and data protection 
(2005) 16. 
4 Section 14(d) of the Constitution provides that 'everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not 
to have the privacy of their communications infringed.' 
5 I Currie & J D De Waal The Bill of Rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 302. 
6 National Media Ltd v Jooste [1996] 2 All SA 510 (A). 
7 J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling's Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 29. 
8 O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd [1954] 3 All SA 159 (C) ("O'Keefe v Argus Printing"). 
9 O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd [1954] 3 All SA 159 (C) at 248 – 249. 
10 Bernstein & others v Bester & others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) ("Bernstein")  
11 Bernstein & others v Bester & others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at paragraph 79. 
12 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 18 - 28. 
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consideration other private facts of a person that are worthy of protection.13  A wider 
approach is necessary in regard to data protection due to the fact that small amounts of 
data may not be regarded as private in terms of the approach followed in Bernstein, but 
the accumulation of the small amounts of data may be of such a nature that the person 
may want to keep it private.14 
 
Neethling provides a convincing criticism of the right to privacy as interpreted in the 
Bernstein case, which forms a powerful argument in favour of conceptual clarity on the 
nature of privacy in South Africa in order to enhance the protection of privacy.   
 
With the rapid rate of technological advancement of modern society there is a necessity 
to mitigate the potential threat to privacy by adopting legislation to protect personal 
information. Whilst it is accurate to state that the Constitution and the common law 
provide for the protection of privacy and a basis for data protection, there is an 
imperative need for the more precise regulation of a data protection regime, in harmony 
with international standards that seek to develop legislation in line with the vast 
technological advancements of the digital age, in order to properly give effect to the 
fundamental right to privacy.15  
 
The necessity to bring South African data protection legislation in line with 
international trends is rooted in the desire to promote social and economic 
development.16 In order to attract foreign investment it will be vital to ensure that 
adequate data protection legislation is enacted and strictly enforced.17 A majority of 
foreign investors are reliant on data and these investors require the comfort of knowing 
that the processing of their data is regulated and therefore protected so as to deter any 
unlawful dissemination of their data.  
 
In an attempt to bring South Africa in line with international prescripts the South 
                                         
13 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 20. 
14 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 20. 
15 Preamble to POPIA. See also A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating 
the current South African position’ (2007) 124(2) SALJ 400. 
16 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 109 (Project 124) Privacy and data protection 
(2005) 40. 
17 R Luck 'POPI – Is South Africa keeping up with international trends' (2014) May De Rebus 46. See also A 
Roos 'Core principles of data protection law' (2006) 39(1) CILSA 104. 
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African Law Reform Commission ("SALRC") published a Discussion Paper18 
("SALRC Discussion Paper") on privacy and data protection in which it recommended 
that formal legislation on the protection of personal information be enacted in order to 
safeguard the right to privacy. The SALRC Discussion Paper contained proposed draft 
legislation that was ultimately signed into law on 19 November 2013 and known as the 
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 ("POPIA"). 
 
POPIA aims to give effect to the Constitutional right to privacy by regulating the 
processing19 of personal information20 by public and private bodies.21 At present, the 
majority of the provisions of POPIA are yet to commence22 therefore the right to 
privacy is currently regulated in terms of the common law and the Constitution, and the 
remedies available to a person whose privacy has been infringed include common law 
remedies23 and delictual remedies.  
 
                                         
18 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 109 (Project 124) Privacy and data protection 
(2005). See also A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current 
South African position’ (2007) 124(2) SALJ 433. 
19 In terms of s 1 of POPIA 'processing' is defined as 'any operation or activity or any set of operations, whether 
or not by automatic means, concerning personal information, including (a)  the collection, receipt, recording, 
organisation, collation, storage, updating or modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use; 
(b)  dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making available in any other form; or 
(c)  merging, linking, as well as restriction, degradation, erasure or destruction of information.' 
20 In terms of s 1 of POPIA 'personal information' means 'information relating to an identifiable, living, natural 
person, and where it is applicable, an identifiable, existing juristic person, including, but not limited to - 
(a)  information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth of the person;  
(b)  information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history of the 
person;  
(c)  any identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical address, telephone number, location information, 
online identifier or other particular assignment to the person;  
(d)  the biometric information of the person;  
(e)  the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person;  
(f)  correspondence sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature or 
further correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence;  
(g)  the views or opinions of another individual about the person; and  
(h)  the name of the person if it appears with other personal information relating to the person or if the 
disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the person;' 
21 Preamble to POPIA. 
22 The sections that have come into operation at this time include: s 1 which contains the definitions; Part A of 
Chapter 5 which establishes the Information Regulator; s 112 which contains the Regulations and s 113 which 
sets out the procedure for making regulations. 
23 The accepted remedies for common law invasions of privacy include the actio iniuriarum, the actio legis 
Aquiliae and the interdict.  
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One of the sections of POPIA24 that have come into operation is s 39 which provides 
for the establishment of an impartial and independent body known as the Information 
Regulator to exercise certain powers and to perform certain duties and functions in 
terms of POPIA.25 The Information Regulator has jurisdiction throughout the Republic 
of South Africa, is accountable to the National Assembly, and is subject only to the 
Constitution.26 The Information Regulator was established on 1 December 2016 and is 
tasked with inter alia monitoring and enforcing compliance by public and private 
bodies with the provisions of POPIA, and the Promotion of Access to Information Act 
2 of 2000.27 
 
In circumstances where an individual commits a privacy breach by unlawfully 
distributing the personal information of a third party, in terms of the common law, the 
third party can only claim against the individual if the third party can prove a wilful or 
negligent wrongful act or omission on the part of the individual that is causally linked 
to the damaged suffered.28 However, a recent trend is for a party who suffers damage to 
base their claim against the employer of an individual if such wrong was committed by 
the individual in the course and scope of his or her employment.29 This allows the 
injured party to expand liability and sue an employer who is likely in a stronger 
financial position than an employee.30  
 
It is a well-established legal principle31 that employers are vicariously liable for the 
negligent acts or omissions by their employees.32 This is a form of strict liability, which 
consists of liability in the absence of fault. South African courts have accepted that the 
establishment of vicarious liability requires that an employee must commit a wrongful 
                                         
24 See note 22 above for list of sections that have commenced. See 'POPI commencement date or POPI effective 
date starts the clock' Michalsons 10 July 2018 available at https://www.michalsons.com/blog/popi-
commencement-date-popi-effective-date/13109, accessed on 4 September 2018.  
25 Preamble to POPIA. 
26 Sections 39(a), 39(b) and 39(d) of POPIA. 
27 Section 40(1)(b) of POPIA. 
28 J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling Potgieter Visser Law of Delict 7th ed (2015) 389. 
29 Or while engaged in any activity incidental thereto in terms of vicarious liability. 
30 J M Potgieter 'Preliminary thoughts on whether vicarious liability should be extended to the parent-child 
relationship' (2011) 32 Obiter 194. 
31 See Minister of Safety and Security v Morudu and Others 2016 (1) SACR 68 (SCA) where the Supreme Court 
of Appeal found that the doctrine of vicarious liability is deeply rooted in the South African legal system. In 
relying on the dictum in the case of F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37; 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC), 
the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated that 'employees are extensions of their employers.' 
32 Messina Associated Carriers v Kleinhaus 2001 (3) SA 868 (SCA) at 872F-I. 
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act; an employer-employee relationship must exist at the time when the wrongful act is 
committed; and the employee must have committed the wrongful act in the course and 
scope of his or her employment.33 
 
The injured party need not prove that the employer acted wilfully or negligently due to 
the fact that the rationale for vicarious liability is not based on the employer's fault, but 
on the employee's fault.34 The criminal action of an employee in disclosing the personal 
information of a third party is beyond the scope of this dissertation.35  
 
Section 99(1) of POPIA creates a form of statutory vicarious liability in that it provides 
that a data subject36 has the right to institute a civil action for damages against a 
responsible party37 in circumstances where the data subject's privacy has been 
infringed, irrespective of whether or not such infringement occurred as a result of intent 
or negligence.38 An employer will be regarded as a responsible party in terms of POPIA 
in that it determines the purpose of and means for processing personal information.39 
Dillard and Bascerano40 assert that 'the responsible party to whom POPIA refers will be 
an employer, since it is usually the employer who determines the reason for the 
processing of personal information.'41 
 
An employer is therefore liable if one of its employees contravenes POPIA by 
infringing on another person's privacy, irrespective of whether or not such infringement 
                                         
33 B E Loots 'Sexual harassment and vicarious liability: a warning to political parties' (2008) 19 SLR 149. 
34 J M Potgieter 'Preliminary thoughts on whether vicarious liability should be extended to the parent-child 
relationship' (2011) 32 Obiter 189. See also K Calitz ‘The close connection test for vicarious liability’ (2007) 
18(3) SLR 458.  
35 See JLJ Edwards ‘Vicarious liability in criminal law’ (1951) 14(3) The Modern Law Review  334 – 340 for an 
expansion on this area. 
36 In terms of s 1 of POPIA 'data subject' is defined as 'the person to whom personal information relates.' 
37 In terms of s 1 of POPIA 'responsible person' is defined as 'a public or private body or any other person 
which, alone or in conjunction with others, determines the purpose of and means for processing personal 
information.' 
38 In terms of s 99(1) the data subject, or the Regulator at the request of the data subject, may institute a civil 
action for damages.  
39 J van Wyk & A Van Heerden 'The Protection of Personal Information Bill from an employment perspective' 
(17 September 2013) Polity.org.za available at http://www.polity.org.za/article/the-protection-of-personal-
information-bill-from-an-employment-perspective-2013-09-17, accessed on 4 September 2018. 
40 D Millard & E.G. Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19 PELJ available at http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v19n1/21.pdf, accessed 21 April 
2018 ("Dillard and Bascerano"). 
41 D Millard & E.G. Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19 PELJ at 9 available at http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v19n1/21.pdf, accessed 21 
April 2018. 
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occurred as a result of intent or negligence.42 
 
Section 99(2) of POPIA provides for the defences available to an employer against an 
action for damages in the event of a breach of the provisions of POPIA. The defences 
available to an employer include vis major;43 consent of the plaintiff; fault on the part 
of the plaintiff; compliance was not reasonably practicable in the circumstances; and 
the Regulator has granted an exemption in terms of section 37 of POPIA.44 
 
Currently in South Africa, due to the fact that data protection legislation essentially 
only exists in theory,45 an injured party can claim against an employer in terms of the 
common law doctrine of vicarious liability. When practically implemented however, 
POPIA can have a detrimental affect on employers in that, in its attempt to strike a 
balance between the rights of employers and those of its employees, it imposes onerous 
obligations on an employer that can result in dire consequences if not implemented. 
 
 
 
                                         
42 D Millard & E.G. Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19 PELJ at 23 available at http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v19n1/21.pdf, accessed 21 
April 2018. 
43 Denotes a greater or superior force for which no one is responsible. Often referred to as an act of God.  
44 Section 37 of POPIA reads as follows:  
'Regulator may exempt processing of personal information  
37. (1) The Regulator may, by notice in the Gazette, grant an exemption to a responsible party to process 
personal information, even if that processing is in breach of a condition for the processing of such information, 
or any measure that gives effect to such condition, if the Regulator is satisfied that, in the circumstances of the 
case - 
(a)  the public interest in the processing outweighs, to a substantial degree, any interference with the privacy of 
the data subject that could result from such processing; or  
(b)  the processing involves a clear benefit to the data subject or a third party that outweighs, to a substantial 
degree, any interference with the privacy of the data subject or third party that could result from such 
processing.  
(2) The public interest referred to in subsection (1) includes—  
(a)  the interests of national security;  
(b)  the prevention, detection and prosecution of offences;  
(c)  important economic and financial interests of a public body;  
(d)  fostering compliance with legal provisions established in the interests referred  
to under paragraphs (b) and (c);  
(e)  historical, statistical or research activity; or  
(f)  the special importance of the interest in freedom of expression.  
(3) The Regulator may impose reasonable conditions in respect of any exemption granted under subsection (1).' 
45 The sections of POPIA that have yet to commence are anticipated to commence towards the end of 2018 
alternatively in 2019. See 'POPI commencement date or POPI effective date starts the clock' Michalsons 10 July 
2018 available at https://www.michalsons.com/blog/popi-commencement-date-popi-effective-date/13109, 
accessed on 4 September 2018. 
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1.2 Statement of purpose  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine POPIA, with particular focus on section 
99, and to critically consider the impact of s 99 on an employer in circumstances where 
an employee breaches the provisions of POPIA.  
 
The statutory vicarious liability as created in s 99 of POPIA is in contrast to the 
common law doctrine of vicarious liability and the statutory vicarious liability created 
in terms of other South African legislation such as the Employment Equity Act No. 55 
of 1998 ("Employment Equity Act"), which are more lenient on the employer and 
provide for adequate means46 for an employer to escape liability.47 
 
Section 99(1) of POPIA provides that a civil action for damages may be instituted 
against an employer, as the responsible party, whether or not there is intent or 
negligence on the part of the employer.  This section is onerous and harsh on an 
employer in that it ultimately provides that the employer is obliged to ensure that its 
employees comply with the provisions of POPIA and should its employees breach the 
provisions of POPIA, the employer will be held accountable regardless of whether or 
not there is intent or negligence on the part of the employer.48 Accordingly, an 
employer who encourages compliance with the provisions of POPIA and who actively 
takes all necessary steps and precautions in order to avoid any contraventions may be 
accountable and liable. 
 
Furthermore the defences available to an employer resisting a civil action for damages 
based on vicarious liability as contained in terms of s 99(2) of POPIA are limited.49  
                                         
46 Section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act provides that an employer will not be held liable for the conduct 
of an employee if that employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the 
employee would not act in contravention the Employment Equity Act. POPIA does not provide a similar 
mechanism for an employer to escape liability. 
47 D Millard & E.G. Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19 PELJ at 4 available at http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v19n1/21.pdf, accessed 21 
April 2018. 
48 D Millard & E.G. Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19 PELJ at 23 available at http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v19n1/21.pdf, accessed 21 
April 2018. 
49 D Millard & E.G. Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19 PELJ at 4 available at http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v19n1/21.pdf, accessed 21 
April 2018. 
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Section 6050 of the Employment Equity Act provides that should employees contravene 
any provision of the Employment Equity Act, whilst performing their duties at work, 
the employer will be liable unless the employer can prove that it did everything 
necessary to prevent the unsought conduct. 
 
An employer can escape liability and avoid being held vicariously liable for the 
contraventions of the Employment Equity Act by its employees in terms of s 60(4) of 
the Employment Equity Act if the employer can prove that it did all that was reasonably 
practicable to ensure that employees would not contravene the Employment Equity Act. 
POPIA does not provide for such defence and as stated by Dillard and Bascerano, 
'undeniably, the law-abiding employer's good deeds will not constitute an acceptable 
defence against retribution in terms of POPI.'51 
 
This dissertation will explore the ways in which statutory vicarious liability as provided 
for in terms of s 99 of POPIA can be extended and the wording thereof modified in 
order to provide for suitable mechanisms and defenses for an employer to adequately 
escape liability.   
 
1.3 Rationale 
 
With the development of the digital age technology has become more prevalent and has 
provided a means to readily access and transfer personal data swiftly. The rapid 
technological advances are increasing the ability to accumulate, store, process and 
                                         
50 Section 60 of the Employment Equity Act provides: 
'Liability of employers 
60.(1) If it is alleged that an employee, while at work, contravened a provision of this Act, or engaged in 
conduct that, if engaged in by that employee's employer, would constitute a contravention of a provision of this 
Act, the alleged conduct must immediately be brought to the attention of the employer. 
(2) The employer must consult all relevant parties and must take the necessary steps to eliminate the alleged 
conduct and comply with the provisions of this Act. 
(3) If the employer fails to take the necessary steps referred to in subsection 2, and it is proved that the 
employee has contravened the relevant provision, the employer must be deemed also to have contravened that 
provision.  
(4) Despite subsection (3), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an employee if that employer is able to 
prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention 
of this Act.' 
51 D Millard & E.G. Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19 PELJ at 31 available at http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/pelj/v19n1/21.pdf, accessed 21 
April 2018. 
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disseminate personal data. The misuse of personal data can constitute an infringement 
of an individual's right to privacy. 
 
Privacy consists of a state of being free from public attention and can be described as 
existing in an individual's truly private realm. When an individual departs from the 
inner sanctum of the private realm and interacts in the public realm the more 
challenging it is from the individual's privacy to be protected.52 
 
The lack of regulation and data principles enables personal information to be readily 
accessible by anyone in the public domain, which in turn can be disseminated and 
exploited worldwide to multiple parties.  
 
It is therefore essential that the right to privacy and personal information is regulated 
and that such legal framework be constantly reassessed by the courts in light of changes 
in technology. 
 
Due to the fact that data protection in South Africa is a relatively new concept and 
POPIA is a newly promulgated piece of legislation there is currently no legal precedent 
in respect of its practical application. There is a wide range of scholarly writing on the 
topic of POPIA, however these writings merely provide views and opinions of others 
and do not provide a sound illustration and understanding of how POPIA will be 
applied. 
 
This dissertation will therefore aim to contribute to the dialogue and interpretation of 
POPIA in its application with particular focus on s 99. 
 
1.4 Research questions 
 
a. How is the right to privacy currently regulated in South Africa? 
 
b.  What is vicarious liability and how is this concept currently regulated in South 
                                         
52 R Davey and L Dahms-Jansen Social Media in the Workplace (2017) 40. 
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Africa? 
 
c.  How will POPIA impact on vicarious liability in South Africa? 
 
d.   What are the potential difficulties that will arise as a result of POPIA with regard 
to vicarious liability? 
 
e. What is the position in Canada and the United Kingdom with regard to vicarious 
liability in respect of privacy breaches and can South Africa derive any beneficial 
measures from these foreign jurisdictions? 
 
f. Does s 99 of POPIA create a form of statutory vicarious liability, and if so, how 
can this section be extended and modified in order to provide for suitable 
mechanisms and defenses for an employer to adequately escape liability? 
 
1.5 Research methodology 
 
A desktop research methodology is this study’s primary research approach. The reason 
that this approach is preferred is that it involves a review and analysis of statute, case 
law and literature in respect of privacy, data protection and the doctrine of vicarious 
liability. This desk study will aim to answer the research questions by gathering and 
analysing sources that are existing and available in print or electronic format. 
 
The Internet will primarily be utilised to aid this research and create an electronic data 
collection of primary and secondary sources using electronic search engines such as 
LexisNexis, Sabinet, Juta and HeinOnline. 
 
POPIA will be the primary piece of legislation examined in this dissertation as it 
regulates data protection in South Africa.  
 
Secondary sources such as academic writings, published textbooks, journal articles and 
online academic research papers will be utilised to examine the strengths and 
weaknesses of POPIA in order to amplify the outcome and recommendations suggested 
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in this study.  
 
In addition, this study will also contain traces of comparative research in terms of 
which data protection and privacy laws in South Africa will be compared to that of 
foreign law. This is necessary due to the fact that data protection is a relatively new 
concept in South Africa and therefore it is necessary to draw inferences from foreign 
law and the inefficiencies in respect thereof. 
 
1.6 Structure of research project 
 
 This research project consists of five chapters. 
 
Chapter one provides an overview and introduction to the topic. It describes the 
purpose of the study, the rationale, the research questions and the research methodology 
approach to be applied in answering the research questions. Chapter one further 
provides a literature review evaluating the current knowledge on the topic. Essentially 
this research proposal will form chapter one of the research project. 
 
Chapter two provides an analysis of the right to privacy in South Africa. This chapter 
examines the common law right to privacy as well as the constitutional right to privacy.  
 
Chapter three provides an in-depth examination of the doctrine of vicarious liability. 
This chapter focuses on the doctrine of vicarious liability under the common law and 
the concept of statutory vicarious liability in terms of POPIA. This chapter considers 
the possible implications posed on an employer in respect of the civil remedies 
contained in s 99 of POPIA. The legal uncertainty provided for in s 99 is explored and 
discussed.  
 
Having analysed the concept of vicarious liability, chapter four then explores foreign 
approaches with regard to vicarious liability in respect of privacy breaches. The 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, ch. 5 in 
Canada, the Data Protection Act 2018 in the United Kingdom and the EU's General 
Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 will be explored. The approaches of Canada 
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and the United Kingdom will be analysed in detail and possible modifications to 
POPIA in light of the approaches of Canada and the United Kingdom will be discussed. 
 
Chapter five sets out the conclusions of the dissertation and provides recommendations 
for the way forward by drawing and deriving measures from those adopted by foreign 
jurisdictions.  
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Chapter 2: An analysis of the right to privacy in South Africa 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
'Privacy, like an elephant, is more readily recognised than described.'53  
 
The concept of privacy is difficult to articulate due to the fact that it 'means different 
things to different people.'54 Individuals have different privacy needs and this makes it 
difficult to provide a constructive conception of privacy.55 According to sociologists 
and psychologists a person has a fundamental need for privacy.56  
 
The absence of a particular definition of privacy does not render it of any less 
importance than other personality rights, however, conceptual clarity on the nature of 
privacy in South Africa is necessary in order to enhance the protection of privacy.57  As 
Gross58 accurately stated: - 
 
'our ability to articulate and apply principles of legal protection diminishes, for we 
become uncertain about precisely what it is that compels us toward protective measures 
and wherein it differs from what has already been recognized or refused recognition 
under established legal theory.’59 
 
In the early nineteen hundreds the Transvaal Supreme Court in R v Umfaan60 described 
the right to privacy as a personality right, which encompasses 'those real rights, those 
rights in rem related to personality, which every free man is entitled to enjoy.'61 
 
                                         
53 J B Young Privacy (1978) 5. 
54 A Roos 'Data Privacy Law' in D P van der Merwe… et al (2ed) Information and Communications Technology 
Law (2016) 370. 
55 See Bernstein & others v Bester & others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) 
SA 262 (A) at 787 – 788 wherein Ackerman J stated 'The concept of privacy is an amorphous and elusive one 
which has been the subject of much scholarly debate.' 
56 J Neethling, JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling's Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) 29. 
57 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 27 - 28 
58 H Gross 'The concept of privacy' (1967) New York University Law Review at 34 – 54. 
59 H Gross 'The concept of privacy' (1967) New York University Law Review at 34. 
60 R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62 ("R v Umfaan"). 
61 R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62 at 66 – 67. 
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Neethling62 describes privacy as: 
 
'…a condition of human life characterized by seclusion from the public and publicity. 
This condition embraces all those personal facts which the person concerned has himself 
determined to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he 
has the will that they be kept private.'63 
 
Roos64 extends on this description of privacy provided by Neethling and states: - 
 
'In other words, the essence of an individual’s interest in privacy is his or her power of 
self-determination over the scope of the information to be excluded from the knowledge 
of others. Therefore a person’s right to privacy entails that he or she should have control 
over his or her personal information.'65 
 
In Bernstein & others v Bester & others NNO66 Ackerman J stated that privacy relates 
only to a person's truly personal aspects and not to every aspect within his/her personal 
knowledge and experience.67 The judgment in Bernstein has faced severe criticism in 
South Africa. Neethling,68 for example, argues that the restrictive interpretation of 
privacy fails to take into consideration other private facts of a person that are worthy of 
protection.69   
 
In Investigating Directorate Serious Economic Offences and others v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
others v Smit NO and others70 the Constitutional Court validated the views expressed 
by Neethling in criticising the approach of the court in Bernstein and deciding that the 
                                         
62 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 18 – 28. 
63 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 19. 
64 A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position’ (2007) 124(2) SALJ. 
65 A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position’ (2007) 124(2) SALJ 421 – 422. 
66 Bernstein & others v Bester & others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) ("Bernstein"). 
67 Bernstein & others v Bester & others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC); National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 
262 (A) at 79. 
68 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 18 - 28. 
69 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ  20. 
70 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others v Smit NO and others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) 
("Investigating Directorate"). 
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Constitutional right to privacy 'does not relate solely to the individual within his or her 
private space'71 Further, the Constitutional Court further confirmed that the right to 
privacy is relevant when a person has the ability to decide what he or she wants to 
disclose to the public and the expectation that the person's decision will be respected is 
reasonable.72 
 
Neethling provides a convincing criticism of the right to privacy as interpreted in 
Bernstein, which forms a powerful argument in favour of conceptual clarity on the 
nature of privacy in South Africa in order to enhance the protection of privacy. 
Neethling goes on to state that 'the concept of privacy should be sought in and defined 
in accordance with its existence and nature in factual reality.'73 Neethling further 
provides a valid critique of the tendency of the courts in South Africa to overlook other 
private facts relating to a person that are worthy of protection such as physical-
psychological integrity, dignity, identity, autonomy, self-realisation and patrimonial 
interests.  
 
Neethling states that the 'constitutional concept of privacy is, on the face of it at least, 
also concerned with what can briefly be described as informational privacy.' Roos goes 
on to state that: 
 
 'the development and growth of telecommunications technology, connecting computers 
in networks (principally the Internet) and enabling the transmission of information 
between computer systems, has further lent impetus to the processing of personal 
information.'74  
 
A wider approach is necessary in regard to data protection due to the fact that small 
amounts of data may not be regarded as private in terms of the approach followed in 
Bernstein, but the accumulation of the small amounts of data may be of such a nature 
                                         
71 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others v Smit NO and others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at 
16. 
72 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and others v Smit NO and others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at 
36. 
73 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 19. 
74 A Roos 'Data privacy law' in Van der Merwe, DP. … et al. Information and Communications Technology Law 
2 ed (2016) 363. 
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that the person may want to keep it private.75 
 
The SALRC Discussion Paper on privacy and data protection stated: 
 
'Privacy is a valuable aspect of personality. Data or information protection forms an 
element of safeguarding a person's right to privacy.'76 
 
As individuals connect on social media, privacy becomes a significant area of concern. 
Social media has altered the way in which individuals interact with one another. It 
follows that technological innovation provides a threat to privacy in that it allows for 
personal information to be effortlessly processed and disseminated within seconds to a 
wide-reaching number of people. 
 
The court in H v W77 accurately held:  
 
'It is in respect of the remedy where infringements of privacy take place in the social 
media that the common law needs to develop….The law has to take into account 
changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility 
in the eyes of the people. Without credibility, law loses legitimacy. If law loses 
legitimacy, it loses acceptance. If it loses acceptance, it loses obedience. It is imperative 
that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with 
wisdom.'78 
 
The right to privacy in South Africa is protected in terms of the common law and the 
Constitution.79 Prior to 199480 the right to privacy was protected under the common law 
only.  
                                         
75 J Neethling 'The concept of privacy in South African Law' (2005) 122 (1) SALJ 20. 
76 SALRC Discussion Paper at iv. 
77 H v W [2013] 2 All SA 218 (GSJ) at 31. 
78 H v W [2013] 2 All SA 218 (GSJ) at 31. 
79 Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
80 The Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 ("the Interim Constitution") came into force 
on 27 April 1994. Section 13 of the Interim Constitution is the forerunner of s 14 of the Constitution which 
provides for the right to privacy as a fundamental human right.  For more, see Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others v Prince (Clarke and Others Intervening); National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v 
Rubin; National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Acton (CCT108/17) [2018] ZACC 30. 
 
 19 
In order to examine the right to privacy it is necessary to analysis the right to privacy 
under the common law and the Constitution. This chapter sets out to provide an 
understanding of the extent of the right to privacy as currently provided for in South 
Africa. Furthermore this chapter touches on the right to privacy in terms of POPIA and 
why the full promulgation of POPIA is crucial in light of the fact that the right to 
privacy is protected by the common law and the Constitution. 
 
2.2 The common law right to privacy  
 
2.2.1 Definition and recognition 
 
The common law provides for personality rights, which includes a person's right to 
dignity, freedom, physical integrity, privacy and reputation.81 The common law right 
to privacy is protected by the common law principles of the law of delict.82 
 
The court in O'Keefe v Argus Printing held that the right to dignity includes the right 
to privacy thereby recognising the right to privacy as an independent personality 
right. This case was the locus classicus for the recognition of an independent right to 
privacy in South African law wherein Watermeyer AJ interpreted dignitas more 
broadly to include all personality rights and interests (with the exception of the right 
to a good name and bodily integrity). 
 
The Constitutional Court in Bernstein later endorsed this recognition and held that 
the right to privacy 'relates only to the most personal aspects of a persons existence, 
and not to every aspect within his/her personal knowledge and experience.'83  
 
In Jansen Van Vuuren NNO v Kruger84 the court held that:  
 
'The actio iniuriarum protects a person’s dignitas and dignitas embraces privacy . . . 
                                         
81 J Neethling & JM Potgieter & PJ Visser Neethling's Law of Personality 2 ed (2005) at 51. 
82 A Roos ‘Data Protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position’ (2007) 124(2) SALJ 422. 
83 Bernstein & others v Bester & others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 79. 
84 Jansen Van Vuuren NNO v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A) ("Jansen van Vuuren NNO v Kruger"). 
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Although the right to privacy has on occasion been referred to as a real right or ius in 
rem . . . it is better described as a right of personality.'85 
 
It follows and has been accepted by the SALRC that: 
 
'…despite the decisions equating privacy with dignity (or honour), it can safely be 
accepted that nowadays the right to privacy is recognised by the common law as an 
independent right of personality and that it has been delimited as such within the 
dignitas concept.'86 
 
As stated in Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 87 there is a general obligation placed on the 
courts to develop the common law in accordance with the spirit, objects and purport 
of the Bill of Rights.88 Ackermann and Goldstone JJ held: 
 
'It needs to be stressed that the obligation of courts to develop the common law, in the 
context of the section 39(2) objectives, is not purely discretionary. On the contrary, it 
is implicit in section 39(2) read with section 173 that where the common law as it 
stands is deficient in promoting the section 39(2) objectives, the courts are under a 
general obligation to develop it appropriately. We say a ‘general obligation’ because 
we do not mean to suggest that a court must, in each and every case where the 
common law is involved, embark on an independent exercise as to whether the 
common law is in need of development and, if so, how it is to be developed under 
section 39(2). At the same time there might be circumstances where a court is obliged 
to raise the matter on its own and require full argument from the parties.'89 
 
It has been accepted by the Constitutional Court that whilst the primary vehicle for 
law reform in South Africa should be the legislature, South African courts are under 
a general obligation to develop the common law when it deviates from the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
                                         
85 Jansen Van Vuuren NNO v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A) at 849. 
86 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 109 (Project 124) Privacy and data protection 
(2005) 9. 
87 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 
2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 39. 
88 See also South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 109 (Project 124) Privacy and data 
protection (2005) 5. 
89 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at 39. 
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2.2.2 Common law remedies for infringement of privacy 
 
An infringement of privacy occurs where an individual intentionally and wrongfully 
interferes with another's right to seclusion in his or her private life.90 In order to 
prove a claim for the invasion of privacy a plaintiff will have to show that there has 
been an unlawful and international infringement of the person's right to privacy.91  
 
The elements of an infringement of privacy that have to be alleged and proved by a 
plaintiff include: - 
 
1. an invasion of privacy; 
 
2. wrongfulness;  and 
 
3. fault in the form of intention or negligence.92 
 
The remedies available to an individual whose privacy has been infringed include 
common law remedies and delictual remedies. The accepted remedies for common 
law invasions of privacy include the actio iniuriarum, the actio legis Aquiliae and an 
interdict. 
 
The most well known common law remedy is the actio iniuriarium, which is 
directed at providing satisfaction for non-patrimonial loss in the form of injury to 
personality. The actio iniuriarum is therefore used to claim satisfaction for the 
wrongful interference with the right to privacy. In order for an individual to succeed, 
she will need to allege and prove that the infringement of privacy was intentional 
and wrongful.93 
 
The actio legis Aquiliae is a remedy available to a plaintiff to claim patrimonial loss 
                                         
90 Woolman and Bishop Constitutional Law 3.   
91 D McQuoid-Mason 'Invasion of privacy: Common law v. Constitutional delict – does it make a difference?' 
(2000) Acta Juridica 228. 
92 D McQuoid-Mason 'Invasion of privacy: Common law v. Constitutional delict – does it make a difference?' 
(2000) Acta Juridica 229. 
93 Jansen van Vuuren and another NNO v Kruger [1993] 2 All SA 619 (A) at 10. 
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sustained as a result of the wrongful, negligent processing of personal information 
and thereby breaching the plaintiff's right to privacy. Unlike the actio iniuriarium 
the actio legis Aquiliae is used where direct patrimonial loss has been sustained 
intentionally or negligently. 
 
A plaintiff can apply to the court for an interdict in order to prevent and stop the 
invasion of his or her privacy from occurring or to prohibit the invasion from 
recurring. A plaintiff may seek an interdict in order to enforce a right. A plaintiff 
may apply for an interdict and proceed with a separate damages claim.94  
 
A plaintiff will be granted an interim interdict if he or she can prove: 
 
1. a prima facie right; 
 
2.  a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not 
granted; 
 
3. the balance of convenience favours the granting of the interim interdict; 
and 
 
4. the plaintiff has no other satisfactory remedy.95 
 
In order to obtain a final interdict the plaintiff will have to prove: - 
 
1. he or she has a clear right; 
 
2. has suffered actual injury or has a reasonable apprehension of irreparable 
injury; 
 
3. no other satisfactory remedy is available.96	
                                         
94 Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Duggan and another [1975] 2 All SA 125 (RA). 
95 McQuoid-Mason 'Invasion of privacy: Common law v. Constitutional delict – does it make a difference?' 
(2000) Acta Juridica 236. 
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2.3 The constitutional right to privacy 
 
Sachs J in Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council97 accurately stated 
the following: 
 
'…Generations of systematised and egregious violations of personal privacy established 
norms of disrespect for citizens that seeped generally into the public administration and 
promoted amongst a great many officials habits and practices inconsistent with the 
standards of conduct now required by the Bill of Rights.  [The right to privacy] 
accordingly requires us to repudiate the past practices that were repugnant to the new 
constitutional values, while at the same time re-affirming and building on those that were 
consistent with these values.'98 
 
It is trite that the Constitution is the supreme law and any law that is inconsistent with 
any provision in respect thereof is invalid.99 Privacy is not an absolute right under 
common law or the Constitution and accordingly it may be limited in certain 
circumstances.100 
 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution sets out the Bill of Rights which 'is a cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and 
affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.'101According to s 
8(1) of Chapter 2 of the Constitution the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights are 
binding on the executive, the legislature, the judiciary and all organs of state. Section 
8(4) of Chapter 2 of the Constitution provides that:  
 
'(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by 
the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person.'  
 
                                                                                                                              
96 McQuoid-Mason 'Invasion of privacy: Common law v. Constitutional delict – does it make a difference?' 
(2000) Acta Juridica 235 - 236. 
97 Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others [1998] ZACC 10. 
98Mistry v Interim National Medical and Dental Council and Others [1998] ZACC 10 at 25. 
99 Section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
100 Section 7(3) of Chapter 2 of the Constitution provides that 'The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the 
limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.' 
101 Section 7(1) of Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
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In terms of s 7(2) of Chapter 2 of the Constitution the state is obliged to 'respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.' Section 7(2) of the 
Constitution thereby imposes a positive duty on the state not to infringe these 
fundamental rights.  
 
Section 14 of Chapter 2 the Constitution entrenches the fundamental right of privacy 
and provides that: - 
 
'14. Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have:  
 
(a) their person or home searched; 
 
(b) their property searched; 
 
(c) their possessions seized; or 
 
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.' 
 
The Constitution further affords the protection of the right to dignity.102 This indicates 
that the right to privacy is considered as a separate right from that of dignity and it 
follows that a person's dignity does not need to be infringed in order for the person to 
enforce the right to privacy.103 
 
In terms of s 36 of Chapter 2 of the Constitution:  
 
'Limitation of rights  
 
36. (1)  The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including – 
 
(a) the nature of the right;  
 
                                         
102 Section 10 of the Constitution.  
103 R Davey and L Dahms-Jansen Social Media in the Workplace (2017) 40. 
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(b)  the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
 
Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law 
may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.' 
 
A breach of the right to privacy as enshrined in s 14 of the Constitution will be 
regarded as an unlawful invasion of privacy. Once the plaintiff has established her 
claim, the onus rests on the defendant to prove that the alleged breach was justified in 
terms of s 36, or to show that the invasion of privacy was justified in the circumstances. 
Fault is not a required element for a constitutional invasion of privacy. 
 
The court in Bernstein held as follows: - 
 
'Caution must be exercised when attempting to project common law principles onto the 
interpretation of fundamental rights and their limitation; it is important to keep in mind 
that at common law the determination of whether an invasion of privacy has taken place 
constitutes a single enquiry, including an assessment of its unlawfulness. As in the case 
of other iniuriae the presence of a ground of justification excludes the wrongfulness of an 
invasion of privacy. In constitutional adjudication under the Constitution, by contrast, a 
two-stage approach must be employed in deciding constitutionality of a statute.'104 
 
The two-stage approach referred to by the court in Bernstein is whereby the following 
questions need to be answered where a constitutional invasion of privacy is alleged: 
 
1. has the invasive conduct infringed the right to privacy in the Constitution? and 
 
2. if so, is such infringement justifiable in terms of the s 36 limitation clause? 
 
                                         
104 Bernstein & others v Bester & others NNO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at 71. 
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2.4  Data protection legislation 
 
It is clear from the above that the right to privacy is regarded as a fundamental human 
right that requires protection. Whilst it is accurate to state that the Constitution and the 
common law provide for the protection of privacy and a basis for data protection there 
is an imperative need for a legislative data protection regime in order to ensure legal 
certainty. 
 
The SALRC was faced with the task of ascertaining whether data protection measures 
were necessary to safeguard the right to privacy or whether the judiciary should be 
tasked with applying the principles of the law of delict in order to protect the right to 
privacy. After undertaking a thorough investigation of the right to privacy the SALRC 
concluded that there is a need to regulate privacy and information protection by a 
general information statute. The SALRC Discussion Paper contained a draft Bill105 and 
this Bill was signed into law in November 2013.106  
 
In his analysis of the Protection of Personal Information Bill Neethling107 agreed with 
the view expressed by the SALRC that there is a need for data protection legislation 
and stated: 
 
'Thirty-five years ago the author came to the conclusion in his doctoral thesis on the 
right to privacy that the introduction of so-called data-protection legislation in our 
country was urgently necessary, in order to protect persons (natural or juristic) against 
the processing of their personal information by the state and private persons (individuals 
and corporations alike).'108 
 
Data processing poses a threat to the right to privacy as provided for under common 
law and the Constitution.109 Roos provides a thorough analysis of data protection in 
                                         
105 Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009. 
106 POPIA. 
107 J Neethling 'Features of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 and the law of delict' (2012) 
THRHR 241. 
108 J Neethling 'Features of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 and the law of delict' (2012) 
THRHR 241. 
109 A Roos 'Data Protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position’ (2007) 124(2) SALJ 421. 
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foreign jurisdictions and in South Africa. Roos concludes that data protection in South 
Africa was not in line with international standards and there is very limited law in 
South African protecting the vast majority of personal information. 
 
Roos goes on to express the importance of the SALRC's proposed Bill110 in rectifying 
the inefficiencies of data protection in South Africa. The Bill was signed into law on 19 
November 2013 and known as POPIA. 
 
Another reason that data protection legislation is crucial is due to that fact that when an 
individual's right to privacy is infringed by unlawful processing of their personal 
information, the individual will rely on the delictual remedies discussed above. As 
Roos states this is not adequate due to the following:  
 
'When the privacy of a person has been infringed by the processing of personal 
information, he or she can rely on the law of delict for a remedy. However, the concept 
of ‘data protection’ or ‘data privacy’ has not been identified and discussed in any case 
law. Unfortunately, traditional delictual principles provide only limited protection for 
the individual’s personal information, because they do not give the individual active 
control over personal information that is being processed. The traditional principles are 
useful in determining whether processing of personal information has taken place 
lawfully or not. However, the traditional principles cannot ensure, for example, that the 
data subject has knowledge of the fact that his or her personal information has been 
collected, or that he or she has access to the information, or that he or she may correct 
incorrect information. For this reason, the recognition of ‘active control principles’ is 
necessary.'111 
 
It follows that data protection legislation is necessary in order to set the legal 
parameters in respect of data processing and personal information. Conceptual clarity is 
necessary in order to avoid any potential communication gap and to ensure that data 
protection is more practically manageable. 
 
A broad measure of agreement has been reached on the basic content and core rules that 
                                         
110 Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009. 
111 A Roos 'Data protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position' (2007) 124(2) SALJ 423. 
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should be provided for in data protection legislation.112 Burchell113 in his article 
expressed the view that South Africa should formulate legislation in line with the 
OECD Guidelines.114 
 
POPIA has accordingly been influenced by the OECD Guidelines and the Council of 
Europe’s (CoE) Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data ("CoE Convention").115 
 
The OECD Guidelines identify eight core principal data protection principles in all 
influential data protection laws. These principles include: collection limitation, data 
quality, purpose specification, use limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual 
participation and accountability. The OECD Guidelines do not provide for the ways in 
which these principles are to be enforced.   
 
Roos116 addresses this shortfall by providing an in-depth analysis of the core data 
protection principles and determining the ways in which these principles may be 
implemented in South Africa. Roos undertakes a thorough investigation of the data 
protection principles and ultimately concludes that these data protection principles 
should form part of South African data protection law. 
 
Roos addressed the need for the legislature to implement data protection legislation by 
stating: 
 
'In conclusion, the South African legislature is urged to adopt the proposals of the South 
African Law Reform Commission as a matter of urgency.'117 
 
Neethling submitted as follows:   
                                         
112 C J Bennett Regulating privacy: data protection and public policy in Europe and the United States (1992) 
95. 
113 J Burchell ‘The Legal Protection of Privacy in South Africa: A transplantable hybrid’ (2009) 13(1) EJCL 1. 
114 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 'Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data' Paris, 1981 ("OECD Guidelines"). 
115 Convention No. 108 of 1981, Strasbourg 28 Jan 1981. Available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/treaties/html/108.htm, accessed on 20 April 2018. 
116 A Roos 'Core principles of data protection law' (2006) 39(1) CILSA 102 – 130. 
117 A Roos 'Personal data protection in New Zealand: lessons for South Africa' (2008) PELJ 109. 
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'Compared to the conclusion reached in the author’s doctoral thesis thirty-five years 
ago, the adoption of legislation for the protection of personal information is now 
completely overdue. An appeal is therefore made to the legislature to finalise its scrutiny 
of the Protection of Personal Information Bill of 2009, recommended by the Law Reform 
Commission, and promulgate the Bill as soon as possible as part of the law of South 
Africa.'118 
 
As submitted by Roos119 the recognition of the right to privacy in the Constitution has a 
significant impact on the State in that 'the legislature and the executive may not pass 
any law or take any action which unreasonably infringes or limits the right.'120 
Furthermore the constitutional recognition of the right to privacy places an obligation 
on the State to adopt legislation for the adequate protection of data privacy, 'since 
ordinary private-law principles provide only partial protection in this respect.'121 
 
Burns and Burger-Smidt122 accurately address why it is important to promulgate data 
protection legislation in South Africa when privacy is protected by the common law 
and the Constitution by stating: 
 
'The answer to this question lies in the globalisation of economies, rapid expansion of 
technology, the convergence of information and communications technology, the 
expansion of the Internet and its ability to swiftly transfer communication from one 
country to another. These factors, coupled with the emergence of new and challenging 
legal issues in a world where information (including personal information) is 
disseminated in a short timeframe and is open to abuse, made it quite clear that the 
protection of personal information is a pressing issue requiring legislative input.'123 
 
Data protection legislation is necessary not only to protect a person's personal 
                                         
118 J Neethling 'Features of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 and the law of delict (2012) 
THRHR 255. 
119 A Roos 'Data protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position' (2007) 124(2) SALJ 400 – 437. 
120 A Roos 'Data protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position' (2007) 124(2) SALJ 423. 
121 A Roos 'Data protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position' (2007) 124(2) SALJ 423. 
122 Y Burns & A Burger-Smidt, A A Commentary on the Protection of Personal Information Act (2018). 
123 Y Burns & A Burger-Smidt, A A Commentary on the Protection of Personal Information Act (2018) 5 – 6.  
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information, but also to protect the fundamental privacy rights of persons that are 
related to that personal information.  
 
2.5 POPIA 
 
Roos124 accurately summarises the aim of POPIA as follows:  
 
'The Act sets out to establish mechanisms or procedures in harmony with international 
prescripts to protect the privacy of personal information.'125 
 
POPIA aims to give effect to the Constitutional right to privacy by providing for data 
protection and thereby safeguarding personal information. Only limited sections of 
POPIA have come into operation with the majority of the sections to commence at a 
later date to be proclaimed by the President.126   
 
The purpose of POPIA is set out in s 2(1), which reads as follows: - 
 
'(a)  give effect to the constitutional right to privacy, by safeguarding personal 
information when processed by a responsible party, subject to justifiable 
limitations that are aimed at – 
 
(i) balancing the right to privacy against other rights, particularly the right of 
access to information; and  
 
(ii)  protecting important interests, including the free flow of information within the 
Republic and across international borders.' 
 
POPIA defines, in s 1, the term 'processing' as:  
 
                                         
124 A Roos 'Data privacy law' in Van der Merwe, DP. … et al. Information and Communications Technology 
Law 2 ed (2016). 
125 A Roos 'Data privacy law' in Van der Merwe, DP. … et al. Information and Communications Technology 
Law 2 ed (2016) 478. 
126 The sections that have come into operation at this time include: s 1 which contains the definitions; Part A of 
Chapter 5 which establishes the Information Regulator; s 112 which contains the Regulations and s 113 which 
sets out the procedure for making regulations. 
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'any operation or activity or any set of operations, whether or 
not by automatic means, concerning personal information, including –  
 
(a) the collection, receipt, recording, organisation, collation, storage, updating or 
modification, retrieval, alteration, consultation or use;  
 
(b)  dissemination by means of transmission, distribution or making available in any 
other form; or  
 
(c)  merging, linking, as well as restriction, degradation, erasure or destruction of 
information;’ 
 
In terms of s 3(1) POPIA applies to the processing of personal information –  
 
'(a)  entered in a record by or for a responsible party by making use of automated or 
non-automated means: Provided that when the recorded personal information is 
processed by non-automated means, it forms part of a filing system or is intended 
to form part thereof; and  
 
(b) where the responsible party is – 
 
(i)  domiciled in the Republic; or  
 
(ii)  not domiciled in the Republic, but makes use of automated or non-automated 
means in the Republic, unless those means are used only to forward personal 
information through the Republic.' 
 
In line with the recommendations expressed by Roos,127 POPIA has incorporated 
conditions for the lawful processing of personal information in line with international 
standards. POPIA aims to guarantee the protection of privacy and to this end it can be 
considered a codification of the common law and Constitutional principles in respect of 
privacy.128 
 
Due to the fact that POPIA is not yet fully operational it cannot be determined as to 
                                         
127 A Roos 'Data protection: Explaining the international backdrop and evaluating the current South African 
position' (2007) 124(2) SALJ 433. 
128 R Davey and L Dahms-Jansen Social Media in the Workplace (2017) 55. 
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whether it fulfils its objectives in safeguarding the right to privacy. The sections of 
POPIA that have come into operation at the time of writing are s 1 which contains the 
definitions; Part A of Chapter 5 which establishes the Information Regulator; s 112 
which contains the Regulations and s 113 which sets out the procedure for making 
regulations. 
 
The office of the Information Regulator is established in accordance with s 39 of 
POPIA and the President appointed the Chairperson and the members of the 
Information Regulator with effect from 1 December 2016 in accordance with s 41 of 
POPIA. The Information Regulator gazetted draft Regulations in terms of s 112(2) of 
POPIA on 8 September 2017 for comment by 7 November 2017. It is believed that the 
Information Regulator is in the process of reviewing the comments submitted to it. 
 
Following the implementation of POPIA, albeit limited sections,129 Roos accurately 
summarises POPIA as follows: 
 
'The Act complies in all important aspects with international standards. It is a 
comprehensive, general law that governs the processing of personal information by both 
the public and the private sectors. It provides for a set of data privacy principles; 
provides heightened protection for sensitive information; establishes an independent 
oversight body to ensure compliance; and gives data subjects such rights as the right to 
be informed of the processing of personal information relating to them, of access to that 
information and to have incorrect information rectified, and provides subjects with civil 
remedies to enforce their rights.'130 
 
It follows that POPIA conforms to international standards and is an effective and 
comprehensive statute that aims to protect the integrity and sensitivity of personal 
informational. 
 
 
 
                                         
129 See note 126. 
130 A Roos 'Data privacy law' in Van der Merwe, DP. … et al. Information and Communications Technology 
Law 2 ed (2016) 478. 
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2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
The State is obliged in terms of s 7(2) of the Constitution to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfill the right to privacy as provided for in the Bills of Rights. It follows that the 
State is attempting to fulfill this obligation in light of the promulgation of POPIA 
following the views and recommendations expressed in the SALRC Discussion 
Paper.131  
 
The President appointed the Chairperson and members of the Information Regulator 
with effect from 1 December 2016, this being the juristic body created in terms of s 39 
of POPIA to inter alia monitor and enforce compliance by public and private bodies 
with the provisions of POPIA. This appointment is a further indication of an attempt on 
the part of the State to fulfill its obligation to protect the right to privacy.  
 
Although enacted, POPIA is not yet fully operational132 and the sections that have 
commenced are of no import when applied in isolation to the remaining provisions. 
POPIA requires full promulgation in order to be of any influence on the right to 
privacy. The delay on the part of the legislature in fully promulgating POPIA provides 
a serious threat to the right to privacy it expressly sets out to protect. This requires 
urgent attention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
131 J Neethling 'Features of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 and the law of delict (2012) 
THRHR 243. 
132 See note 126. 
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Chapter 3: An examination of vicarious liability in South Africa 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
It is common cause, that in terms of the doctrine of vicarious liability, an employer is 
held accountable for the actions or omissions of its employees if such action or 
omission was committed by the employee in the course and scope of the his or her 
employment.133 
 
Mogoeng J defines vicarious liability as:  
 
' … a person may be held liable for the wrongful act or omission of another even though 
the former did not, strictly speaking, engage in any wrongful conduct. This would arise 
where there is a particular relationship between those persons, such as employment. As a 
general rule, an employer is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts or omissions of an 
employee committed within the course and scope of employment, or whilst the employee 
was engaged in any activity reasonably incidental to it.'134 
 
The doctrine of vicarious liability stems from considerations of public policy and the 
notion that an individual whose rights have been wrongfully breached should not be left 
without a claim.135 
 
In Minister of Safety and Security v Morudu136 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
the doctrine of vicarious liability is deeply rooted in the South African legal system. In 
relying on the dictum in F v Minister of Safety and Security,137 the court reiterated that 
'employees are extensions of their employers.'138 
 
 
 
                                         
133 T.J. Scott 'Some reflections on vicarious liability and dishonest employees' 2000 Acta Juridica 266. 
134 F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37; 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC) at paragraph 40. 
135 R Le Roux 'Vicarious liability: revisiting an old acquaintance' 2003 ILJ 1879. 
136 Minister of Safety and Security v Morudu and Others 2016 (1) SACR 68 (SCA). 
137  F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37; 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC) ("F v Minister of Safety 
and Security").  
138 F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37; 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC) at 45. 
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3.2 The doctrine of vicarious liability under the common law 
 
The doctrine of vicarious liability was first recognised in Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall139 
where the court held:  
 
'… a master who does his work by the hand of a servant creates a risk of harm to others 
if the servant should prove to be negligent or inefficient or untrustworthy; that, because 
he has created this risk for his own ends he is under a duty to ensure that no one is 
injured by the servant’s improper conduct or negligence in carrying on his work and that 
the mere giving by him of directions or orders to his servant is not a sufficient 
performance of that duty. It follows that if the servant’s acts in doing his master’s work 
or his activities incidental to or connected with it are carried out in a negligent or 
improper manner so as to cause harm to a third party the master is responsible for that 
harm.’140  
 
The doctrine of vicarious liability is a form of strict liability, which consists of liability 
in the absence of fault.141 This is due to the fact that an employer will be held liable for 
the negligent acts or omissions by its employees irrespective of the fact that the 
employer was not the person that committed the wrongful act and was 'entirely 
removed from the event.'142  
 
In Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security143 Plasket J held: 
 
'In the normal course, a person is not liable in delict to another unless he or she has 
caused harm to that other person by a wrongful and unlawful act or omission. The 
imposition of vicarious liability is an exception to this norm: an employer who has 
committed no wrong is held liable for the consequences of his or her employee’s 
wrongful and unlawful conduct.'144 
 
                                         
139 Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733 at 741. 
140 Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD at 741. 
141 T.J. Scott 'Some reflections on vicarious liability and dishonest employees' 2000 Acta Juridica 266. 
142 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 16. 
143 Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security [2015] ZAECGHC 56 ("Booysen v Minister of Safety and 
Security"). 
144 Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security [2015] ZAECGHC 56 at paragraph 9. 
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3.2.1 Requirements for vicarious liability 
 
The common law requirements145 for vicarious liability are as follows: - 
 
a) an employment relationship must exist;  
 
b) the employee’s conduct must have been unlawful; 
 
c) the act of the employee must have led to a third person suffering 
damages; and  
 
d)  the act must have taken place within the scope of his or her 
employment.146  
 
The contract of employment can be defined as:  
 
'The contract of employment is the foundation of the relationship between an 
employee and his employer. The contract links the employer and the employee in an 
employment relationship. The existence of an employment relationship is the starting 
point for the application of all labour law rules: if there is no employment 
relationship between the parties, the rules of labour law do not apply to that 
relationship.'147 
 
The existence of an employment relationship, that is a contract of employment,148 at 
the time of the commission of the wrongful act by the employee is the primary 
requirement for the employer to be held vicariously liable to a third party.149 For an 
employer to be held liable to a third party it must be established in which capacity 
the employee was acting at the commission of the delict due to the fact that an 
                                         
145 See Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 at 390. 
146 B Loots 'Sexual harassment and vicarious liability: a warning to political parties' (2008) 19 SLR 149. 
147 A Basson … et al Essential Labour Law 4 ed (2005) 19. 
148 In South African labour legislation there is no legal requirement that an employer and employee must enter 
into a written contract of employment in order for an employment relationship to exist. However, s 29 of the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1998 stipulates that an employer must supply an employee, when 
the employee commences employment, with certain particulars in writing. This is generally done in the form of 
a contract of employment. 
149 B Loots 'Sexual harassment and vicarious liability: a warning to political parties' (2008) 19 SLR 149. 
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employer cannot be held liable on account of a wrongful act by an agent or 
independent contractor.150 
 
In order for an employment relationship to be established the basic elements of the 
contract of employment need to be present, namely: 
 
(a) a contract; 
 
(b) in terms of which services are rendered; 
 
(b) under the authority of the employer; 
 
(d) for remuneration; and 
 
(e) for a fixed term.151 
 
Section 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 defines an employee as: - 
 
'(a)  Any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another 
person or for the state and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any 
remuneration; and  
 
(b)  Any person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of the employer.' 
 
The definition of an employee as provided for in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 
1995 is replicated in s 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1998. 
 
An employer of an independent contractor is not vicariously liable for the wrongful 
acts of the independent contractor due to the fact that the independent contractor 
                                         
150 Stein v Rising Tide Productions CC 2002 2 All SA 22 (C) at 26 – 27. 
151 Section 83 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1998 and s 200A of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995. 
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carries out certain specified work152 and is not subject to the control or directions of 
the employer concerning the performance of such work. 
 
In SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie153 the court formulated six important 
characteristics of employment and a contract of work in respect of independent 
contractors. These characteristics include:  
 
'1.  The object of the contract of service is the rendering of personal services by 
the employee to the employer. The services are the object of the contract. The 
object of the contract of work is the performance of a certain specified work or 
the production of a certain specified result. 
 
2.  According to a contract of service the employee will typically be at the beck 
and call of the employer to render his personal services at the behest of the 
employer. The independent contractor, by way of contrast, is not obliged to 
perform the work himself or to produce the result himself, unless otherwise 
agreed upon. He may avail himself of the labour of others as assistants or 
employees to perform the work or to assist him in the performance of the work.  
 
3.  Services to be rendered in terms of a contract of service are at the disposal of 
the employer who may in his own discretion subject of course to questions of 
repudiation decide whether or not he wants to have them rendered. The 
independent contractor is bound to perform a certain specified work or 
produce a certain specified result within a time fixed by the contract of work or 
within a reasonable time where no time has been specified. 
 
4.  The employee is subordinate to the will of the employer. He is obliged to obey 
the lawful commands, orders or instructions of the employer who has the right 
of supervising and controlling him by prescribing to him what work he has to 
do as well as the manner in which it has to be done. The independent 
contractor, however, is notionally on a footing of equality with the employer. 
He is bound to produce in terms of his contract of work, not by the orders of the 
employer. He is not under the supervision or control of the employer. Nor is he 
                                         
152 SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie 1999 20 ILJ 1936 (LAC).   
153 SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie 1999 20 ILJ 1936 (LAC).   
 
 39 
under any obligation to obey any orders of the employer in regard to the 
manner in which the work is to be performed. The independent contractor is his 
own master.  
 
5.  A contract of service is terminated by the death of the employee whereas the 
death of the parties to a contract of work does not necessarily terminate it.  
 
6.  A contract of service terminates on expiration of the period of service entered 
into while a contract of work terminates on completion of the specified work or 
on production of the specified result.'154 
 
In terms of the second requirement for vicarious liability an employer is only liable 
for the conduct of an employee if the conduct satisfies the essential requirements for 
the commission of a wrongful act or delict, these being:  
 
a) an act or omission by the employee; 
 
b) which was wrongful; 
 
c) actual damage or personal injury must have been suffered by the third 
party; 
 
d)  which act or omission caused the damage or personal injury to the third 
party; and 
 
e)  was committed in a wilful or negligent manner.155 
 
A delict can be described as the wrongful and culpable act of a person that causes 
harm to another. The purpose of the law of delict is to compensate an individual for 
loss suffered therefore a prerequisite for liability is that the individual must have 
suffered harm. As held in the case of Jowell v Bramwell-Jones and others:156 
                                         
154 SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie 1999 20 ILJ 1936 (LAC) at paragraph 9. 
155 Crown Chickens v Rieck 2007 ILJ 307 (SCA) 
156 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones and others 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA). 
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'The element of damage or loss is fundamental to the Aquilian action and the right of 
action is incomplete until damage is caused to the plaintiff by reason of the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct.'157 
 
It follows that the wrongful act is incomplete until the harm arises. 
 
In respect of the third requirement for vicarious liability, the employee's act must 
have led to a third person suffering damages in order for the employer to be held 
liable. An employer will be held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees 
where the third party is able to show that the damage was caused by the employee, 
either intentionally or negligently, in the course of his or her employment duties.158 
 
As accurately held by Judge Watermeyer: 
 
'…It follows that if the servant’s acts in doing his master’s work or his activities 
incidental to or connected with it are carried out in a negligent or improper manner 
so as to cause harm to a third party the master is responsible for that harm.’159  
 
The Constitutional Court in the case of Country Cloud Trading CC160 held: 
 
'So the element of wrongfulness provides the necessary check on liability in these 
circumstances. It functions in this context to curb liability and, in doing so, to ensure 
that unmanageably wide or indeterminate liability does not eventuate and that 
liability is not inappropriately allocated.'161 
 
In H v Fetal Assessment Centre162 the Constitutional Court held: 
 
'From this it is apparent that "harm-causing conduct" is a prerequisite for the further 
                                         
157 Jowell v Bramwell-Jones and others 2000 3 SA 274 (SCA) at paragraph 22. 
158 Minister of Safety and Security v Jordaan 2000 (4) SA 21 (SCA) at paragraph 5. 
159 Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD at 741. 
160 Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development, Gauteng [2014] ZACC 28. 
161 Country Cloud Trading CC v MEC, Department of Infrastructure Development, Gauteng [2014] ZACC 28 at 
paragraph 25. 
162 H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) BCLR 127 (CC). 
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enquiry into the other elements of delict, namely wrongfulness and fault. Without 
harm-causing conduct there is no conduct which can be found to be wrongful or 
committed with the requisite degree of fault.'163 
 
The fourth requirement, being whether or not the employee acted within the scope 
and course of his or her employment, is the most controversial of the requirements 
and has proved to be the most difficult to determine.164 It is accepted that employees 
act within the scope and course of their employment when they carry out 
instructions authorised by their employer, even when they perform the instructions 
in an unlawful manner.165 
 
In Minister of Safety and Security v Jordaan,166, Scott JA stated:  
 
‘The standard test for vicarious liability of a master for the delict of a servant is 
whether the delict was committed by the employee while acting in the course and 
scope of his employment. The enquiry is frequently said to be whether at the relevant 
time the employee was about the affairs, or business, or doing the work of the 
employer....’167 
 
The accepted common law test for vicarious liability was first applied in Minister of 
Police v Rabie168 wherein the court held: - 
 
‘It seems clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and 
purposes, although occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course or 
scope of his employment, and that in deciding whether an act by the servant does so 
fall, some reference is to be made to the servant’s intention . . . The test is in this 
regard subjective. On the other hand, if there is nevertheless a sufficiently close link 
                                         
163 H v Fetal Assessment Centre 2015 (2) BCLR 127 (CC) at paragraph 54. 
164 S Murray The extent of an employer's vicarious liability when an employee act within the scope of 
employment (LLB, North West University, 2012) 1.  
165 Costa Da Oura Restaurant (Proprietary) Limited T/A Umdloti Bush Tavern v Anthony Reddy 2003 24 ILJ 
1337 (SCA).  
166 Minister of Safety and Security v Jordaan 2000 (4) SA 21 (SCA).   
167 Minister of Safety and Security v Jordaan 2000 (4) SA 21 (SCA) at paragraph 5. 
168 Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) ("Minister of Police v Rabie"). 
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between the servant’s acts for his own interests and purposes and the business of his 
master, the master may yet be liable. This is an objective test.'169 
 
As established in Minster of Police v Rabie,170 the accepted common law test for 
vicarious liability therefore contains two questions, these being:  
 
a) whether the employee committed the wrongful acts solely for his or her 
own interests or those of the employer; and 
 
b)  if the employee was acting for his or her own interests, whether there 
was nevertheless a 'sufficiently close link' between the employee’s 
conduct and the business of his or her employment. 
 
In deviation cases an employee commits unlawful conduct whilst straying from the 
tasks for which the employee was appointed. In traditional vicarious liability cases 
the wrongful acts or omission of an employee are committed within the course and 
scope of the employee's employment, in deviation or detour cases, the wrongful acts 
or omissions are committed by an employee outside the course and scope of the 
employee's employment. 
 
In NK v Minister of Safety and Security171 the court applied the common law test as 
established in Minster of Police v Rabie and held that the common law doctrine of 
vicarious liability should be developed to reflect the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution.  
 
In this case a woman ("the complainant") was raped by three policemen that were on 
duty at the time, in uniform and in a marked police vehicle. The three policemen 
were convicted of rape and the complainant thereafter sued the Minister of Safety 
and Security for damages based on vicarious liability. The court a quo dismissed the 
complainant's claim against the Minister and the complainant subsequently appealed 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
                                         
169 Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) at 134 C-E. 
170 Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) at 134 C-E. 
171 NK v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] ZACC 8; 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) ("NK 
v Minister of Safety and Security"). 
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The Supreme Court of Appeal172 dismissed the appeal and held that the acts of the 
policemen could not be regarded as having been done within the course and scope of 
their employment and further held that it is: 
 
‘... unnecessary to consider the question of the development of the law which in any 
event would best be dealt with by the legislature should a change in law be 
considered necessary.’173 
 
The complainant thereafter appealed to the Constitutional Court which had to 
determine whether the Minister was vicariously liable. The Constitutional Court 
applied the two-stage common law test for liability as established in Minister of 
Police v Rabie. O'Regan J found that the three policemen committed the wrongful 
act (the rape of the complainant) solely for their own interests. In respect of the 
second part of the two-stage test the court held: 
 
'The next question that arises is whether, albeit that the policemen were pursuing 
their own purposes when they raped the applicant, their conduct was sufficiently 
close to their employer’s business to render the respondent liable. In this regard, 
there are several important facts which point to the closeness of that connection. 
First, the policemen all bore a statutory and constitutional duty to prevent crime and 
protect the members of the public. That duty is a duty which also rests on their 
employer and they were employed by their employer to perform that obligation. 
Secondly, in addition to the general duty to protect the public, the police here had 
offered to assist the applicant and she had accepted their offer. In so doing, she 
placed her trust in the policemen although she did not know them personally. One of 
the purposes of wearing uniforms is to make police officers more identifiable to 
members of the public who find themselves in need of assistance.'174 
 
Furthermore O'Regan J held: 
 
'Thirdly, the conduct of the policemen which caused harm constituted a simultaneous 
                                         
172 NK v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] ZACC 8; 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC). 
173 NK v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] ZACC 8; 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) at 8. 
174 NK v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC) at 51. 
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commission and omission. The commission lay in their brutal rape of the applicant. 
Their simultaneous omission lay in their failing while on duty to protect her from 
harm, something which they bore a general duty to do, and a special duty on the facts 
of this case. In my view, these three inter-related factors make it plain that viewed 
against the background of our Constitution, and, in particular, the constitutional 
rights of the applicant and the constitutional obligations of the respondent, the 
connection between the conduct of the policemen and their employment was 
sufficiently close to render the respondent liable.'175 
 
This approach by the Constitutional Court should be embraced as it enforces that the 
protection of fundamental rights is of profound constitutional importance. The 
Constitutional Court in coming to its decision applied the two stage common law 
test as developed in Minster of Police v Rabie and went further by developing and 
expanding the test to take into consideration constitutional norms. The 
Constitutional Court expanded on the second stage of the common law test by 
stating that in answering the second question176 of the test the court should promote 
constitutional values in the assessment of the presence of a sufficient link.177 
Although there was a deviation from the employment duties of the policemen, there 
was a sufficiently close connection between the policemans employment and the 
rape to hold the Minister vicariously liable. 
 
The case of F v Minister of Safety and Security178 involved the rape of a 13-year-old 
girl by a SAPS police officer whilst on standby duty. The accused was in an 
unmarked police vehicle to enable him to perform any police functions that he might 
have been required to perform whilst on standby duty. The accused told the girl that 
he was a private detective and the girl understood this to mean that the accused was 
a police officer. The girl trusted the accused for this reason. 
 
The girl's claim against the Minister of Safety and Security was successful in the 
                                         
175 NK v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC) at 53. 
176 The second question as developed in Minister of Police v Rabie is if the employee was acting for his or her 
own interests, whether there was nevertheless a 'sufficiently close link' between the employee’s conduct and the 
business of his or her employment. 
177 NK v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC) at 32. 
178 F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37; 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC); 2012 (3) BCLR 244 (CC) ("F v 
Minister of Safety and Security").  
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High Court; however, the Supreme Court of Appeal then overturned the High 
Court's decision. The girl appealed to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court, in determining the relevant interrelated normative factors at play, held:  
 
'…the state’s constitutional obligations to protect the public; the trust that the public 
is entitled to place in the police; the significance, if any, of the policeman having been 
off duty and on standby duty; the role of the simultaneous act of the policeman’s 
commission of rape and omission to protect the applicant; and the existence or 
otherwise of an intimate link between the policeman’s conduct and his 
employment.'179  
 
The Constitutional Court, in finding that the Minister of Safety and Security was 
vicariously liable for the damages suffered by the girl as a result of the rape and 
assault, held that the facts of the case gave rise to a sufficiently close link between 
the accused's employment and the assault and rape of the girl. The close link was 
founded on the grounds that, although the accused was not in uniform at the time of 
the assault, his police vehicle facilitated the commission of the rape; the girl placed 
her trust in the accused due to the fact that he was a police official; and that the state 
has a constitutional obligation to protect the public against crime.180  
  
The Constitutional Court in F v Minister of Safety and Security ultimately expanded 
the two-stage test for vicarious liability.  This is an important judgment as the 
Constitutional Court clarified the normative basis for holding the state vicariously 
liable for the criminal acts of police officers. This clarification is of vital importance 
as it promotes and develops state accountability for the criminal acts of police 
officers. In its judgment the Constitutional Court expunges the requirement that the 
employee must be acting 'within the course and scope of his or her employment' for 
vicarious liability to be imposed. 
 
In the recent case181 of Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security182 the 
                                         
179 F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37; 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC); 2012 (3) BCLR 244 (CC) at 52. 
180 F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37; 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC); 2012 (3) BCLR 244 (CC) at 53. 
181 Judgment handed down on 27 June 2018. 
182 Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security [2018] ZACC 18. 
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Constitutional Court confirmed that the two-stage test for vicarious liability is an 
established legal test. The court held: 
 
'The two-stage enquiry for the imposition of vicarious liability in deviation cases first 
set out in Rabie and as developed in K and F is now an established legal test. 
Vicarious liability matters involve a careful consideration and weighing of the 
various factors set out in K and F to establish whether a sufficiently close link exists 
between an employee’s conduct and the business of an employer. K and F expressly 
refer to factors as opposed to requirements and the weight to be accorded to each 
factor must inevitably be determined on a case by case basis. This flexibility inherent 
in the test will naturally lead to different factors being accorded different weights by 
different courts, but it is this very flexibility that has imbued the common law of delict 
with the values of the Constitution. As the applicant has not put forward an argument 
that the established test should be developed in order to afford greater weight to any 
one factor, this matter purely concerns the application of an established test. The 
threshold requirement of jurisdiction has not been met.'183 
 
As concluded by Kriegler J184 in determining whether the employee acted within or 
without the course and scope of employment, the weighing up of the employee's 
subjective intention against the objective manifestations of his or her carrying out 
official duties is required. However if the act: 
 
 'was committed solely for the employee’s own interests and purposes may fall outside 
the ambit of conduct that renders the employer liable, it is in our law established that 
liability may nevertheless follow if, objectively seen, there is a ‘sufficiently close link’ 
between the self-directed conduct and the employer’s business.'185 
 
The Constitutional Court has accepted186 that in order for an employer to be held 
vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of its employees a careful 
consideration and weighing of the various factors set out in K187 and F188 is required 
                                         
183 Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security [2018] ZACC 18 at paragraph 62. 
184 Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Japmoco 2002 5 SA 649 (SCA) at paragraph 7. 
185 Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA) at paragraph 28. 
186 See Booysen v Minister of Safety and Security [2018] ZACC 18. 
187 NK v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 26 ILJ 1205 (CC). 
188 F v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZACC 37; 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC); 2012 (3) BCLR 244 (CC). 
 
 47 
in order to establish whether a sufficiently close link exists between an employee’s 
conduct and the business of an employer.  
 
3.2.2 Common-law defences to vicarious liability  
 
The court in Minister of Police v Rabie189 stated: 
 
'An employer cannot be held liable if his employee performed an independent act, or 
acted for a purpose personal to the employee, or was motivated entirely by personal 
reasons such as spite or malice.' 
 
The following common-law defences are available to an employer in order to defend 
a claim founded on vicarious liability:  
(a) the employee acts in defiance of an employer's express instruction and 
acted outside the course and scope of his or her duties;190 or  
 
(b) the employee deliberately committed a dishonest act solely for his or 
her  own interests and purposes and such dishonest act is not sufficiently 
linked to the employer's business, thus falling outside the ambit of 
conduct that renders the employer liable;191 or  
 
(c)  the employee abandoned his or her work and engaged in a frolic of his or 
her own.192 
 
When an employee departs from an employer's express instruction, the employee 
acts outside the course and scope of his or her duties.193 The court in Bezuidenhout v 
Eskom194 held that that an employer will not liable where the employee's negligence 
in completing tasks within the course and scope of his duties caused damage to a 
third party because the employee ignored the employer's express instructions. 
 
                                         
189 Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 1 SA 117 (AD).   
190 Bezuidenhout v Eskom 2003 3 SA 83 (SCA).   
191 Minister of Finance v Gore 2007 1 SA 111 (SCA).   
192 Ess Kay Electronics (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 2001 1 SA 1214 (SCA).   
193 Bezuidenhout v Eskom 2003 3 SA 83 (SCA). 
194 Bezuidenhout v Eskom 2003 3 SA 83 (SCA).  
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In SA Railways & Harbours v Marais195 the court held that where an employee 
performs an act expressly prohibited by the employer, such act constitutes a 
prohibition, which limits the sphere of employment. 
 
The court in Mkize v Martens196 held:   
 
'A master is answerable for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his 
employment, bearing in mind that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests 
and purposes, and outside his authority, is not done in the course of his employment, 
even though it may have been done during his employment.' 
 
Accordingly, if an employee does something which he or she was prohibited from 
doing for the purposes of employment, but which he or she may have been 
permitted to do for his or her own personal purposes, the employer will not be liable 
unless the act was incidental to the employment. 
 
The two-stage common law test for liability test as established in Minster of Police v 
Rabie confirms that an employer will only evade liability if his employee, viewed 
subjectively, has not only exclusively promoted his own interests, but viewed 
objectively, has also completely disengaged himself from the duties of his contract of 
employment. This approach adopted in Minster of Police v Rabie has been 
subsequently confirmed by the Constitutional Court in NK v Minister of Safety and 
Security and F v Minister of Safety and Security.197 
 
3.3 The concept of statutory vicarious liability in terms of POPIA  
 
Section 2(c) of POPIA provides that one of the purposes of POPIA is to provide data 
subjects with rights and remedies to protect their personal information from processing 
that is not in accordance with POPIA.  
 
                                         
195 SA Railways & Harbours v Marais 1950 4 SA 610 (A). 
196 Mkize v Martens 1914 AD 382 at paragraph 390. 
197 In these cases the courts used and accepted the two-stage common-law test for liability as developed in 
Minister of Police v Rabie. This test had both a subjective stage (evaluating the state of mind of the employee) 
and an objective stage (considering the link between the delict and the employer's enterprise). 
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A 'data subject' in terms of POPIA is described as a person to whom personal 
information relates whereas a 'responsible party' is a private or public body or person 
who determines the purpose of and means for processing personal information. 
 
Millard and Bascerano198 state that s 99 of POPIA essentially provides a form of 
statutory vicarious liability and imposes significant obligations on an employer.199 They 
state that: 
 
'the responsible party to whom POPI refers will be an employer, since it is usually the 
employer who determines the reason for the processing of personal information.'200 
 
Accordingly, Millard and Bascerano conclude that an employer will be held liable for 
any contraventions of POPIA or any unlawful infringement upon a data subject's right 
to privacy by its employees due to the fact that an employer is regarded as a responsible 
party.201 
 
POPIA, when applied in the workplace has far-reaching consequences for responsible 
parties, being employers, as it creates strict liability on the part of the employer and 
holds the employer accountable for the wrongful acts of its employees.  
 
According to Neethling:  
 
'This principle is really self-evident and in line with the common law position that the 
person processing personal data can be prohibitorily or mandatorily interdicted, or will 
be liable - and thus accountable - for the wrongful infringement of privacy or identity. 
However, whereas intent or negligence is a requirement for liability at common law, 
according to the Bill liability is strict.'202 
 
                                         
198 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 19. 
199 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 1 ("Millard and Bascerano"). 
200 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 9. 
201 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 3. 
202 J Neethling 'Features of the Protection of Personal Information Bill, 2009 and the law of delict' (2012) 
THRHR 247. 
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Section 99(1) of POPIA provides as follows: - 
 
'99 Civil remedies 
 
(1) a data subject or, at the request of the data subject, the Regulator, may institute a 
civil action for damages in a court having jurisdiction against a responsible party 
for breach of any provision of this Act as referred to in section 73, whether or not 
there is intent or negligence on the part of the responsible party.' 
 
In terms of this section, a civil action for damages may be instituted against the 
responsible party whether or not there is intent or negligence on the part of the 
responsible party. The employer must ensure that its employees comply with POPIA 
and failure by its employees to comply will render the employer accountable.203 
 
Section 73 provides: - 
 
'73  Interference with protection of personal information of data subject 
 
 For the purposes of this Chapter, interference with the protection of the personal 
information of a data subject consists, in relation to that data subject, of – 
 
(a) any breach of the conditions for the lawful processing of personal 
information as referred to in Chapter 3; 
 
(b) non-compliance with section 22, 54, 69, 70, 71 or 72; or 
 
(c) a breach of the provisions of a code of conduct issued in terms of section 60.' 
 
Accordingly, in terms of s 99(1) an employer can be held vicariously liable in 
circumstances where an employee breaches the provisions of POPIA and infringes a 
data subject's privacy, despite the employers attempt to provide measures to regulate 
the lawful processing of personal information. Ultimately s 99(1) provides that any 
breach of POPIA or any unlawful infringement upon a data subject's right to privacy by 
                                         
203 Section 99(1) of POPIA. 
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an employee will result in the employer being held accountable. 
 
Millard and Bascerano undertake a comparative analysis between the common law 
defences that may be raised by an employer attempting to escape vicarious liability and 
the statutory defences available to an employer in terms of POPIA.  The authors argue 
that: 
 
 '… the statutory vicarious liability created by POPI is too harsh.'204  
 
They submit that the reason for this is due to that fact that s 99(2) is not in harmony 
with the defences available to an employer in terms of s 60(4) of the Employment 
Equity Act. 
 
The defences that are available to an employer in the event of a breach of POPIA by its 
employees is contained in s 99(2) which reads as follows: - 
 
'(2) In the event of a breach the responsible party may raise any of the following 
defences against an action for damages:  
 
(a) Vis major; 
 
(b) consent of the plaintiff; 
 
(c) fault on the part of the plaintiff; 
 
(d) compliance was not reasonably practicable in the circumstances of the particular 
case; or 
 
(e) the Regulator has granted an exemption in terms of section 37.' 
 
Section 37 reads as follows: - 
 
                                         
204 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 1. 
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'Regulator may exempt processing of personal information  
 
37. (1) The Regulator may, by notice in the Gazette, grant an exemption to a responsible 
party to process personal information, even if that processing is in breach of a 
condition for the processing of such information, or any measure that gives effect 
to such condition, if the Regulator is satisfied that, in the circumstances of the 
case. –  
 
(a)   the public interest in the processing outweighs, to a substantial degree, any 
interference with the privacy of the data subject that could result from such 
processing; or  
 
(b)   the processing involves a clear benefit to the data subject or a third party that 
outweighs, to a substantial degree, any interference with the privacy of the 
data subject or third party that could result from such processing…' 
 
Giles205 identifies the issue concerning the lack of clarity in determining the import of s 
99(2)(d) of POPIA. Giles, in dealing with the uncertainty in the interpretation of clause 
99(2)(d) goes on to suggest that compliance with POPIA is not absolute and a 
responsible party only has to do what is 'reasonably practicable' in order to comply 
with POPIA. This imprecise terminology will surely lead to uncertainty on the basis of 
what can be considered as 'reasonably practicable.'  
 
Giles goes on to state that 'reasonably practicable is a balance between the damages 
suffered and the steps taken in avoiding the risks.'206 
 
Section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act states: 
 
‘(4) Despite subsection (3), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an employee if 
that employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure 
                                         
205 J Giles 'Only do what is reasonably practicable to comply with POPI' (23 May 2014 available at 
https://www.michalsons.com/blog/reasonably-practicable-to-comply-with-popi/13296, accessed on 21 April 
2018). 
206 J Giles 'Only do what is reasonably practicable to comply with POPI' (23 May 2014 available at 
https://www.michalsons.com/blog/reasonably-practicable-to-comply-with-popi/13296, accessed on 21 April 
2018). 
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that the employee would not act in contravention of this Act.’ 
 
Therefore, in terms of the Employment Equity Act if the employer is able to prove that 
it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in 
contravention of the Employment Equity Act, the employer will be able to avoid being 
held vicariously liable for the contraventions by its employees. The Employment 
Equity Act therefore provides for the ability of the employer to escape liability in 
circumstances where the employer has taken all precautionary actions to prevent 
unlawful conduct of its employees. 
 
Section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act is therefore an exemption clause that 
stipulates that the employer is limited or excluded from liability if it 'did all that was 
reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention 
of'207 the Employment Equity Act. 
 
POPIA, contrary to the Employment Equity Act, does not provide such an exemption 
clause to employers and employers, in terms of POPIA, can be held vicariously liable 
for breach of any provision of POPIA whether or not there is intent or negligence on 
the part of the employer, even in circumstances where the employer has promoted 
compliance with POPIA and diligently strived to avoid contraventions of POPIA on the 
part of its employees.208 
 
The Employment Equity Act states in s 60(1) that the employees contravention of the 
Employment Equity Act must occur 'while at work.'209 This section resembles the 
common law requirement for vicarious liability that the employees wrongful act must 
have taken place within the scope of his or her employment.210 POPIA does not 
expressly provide this requirement. Consequently POPIA makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for an employer to evade liability in circumstances where an employee 
                                         
207 Section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act. 
208 Sections 99(1) and 99(2) of POPIA. 
209 Section 60(1) of the Employment Equity Act states: 
'60. (1) If it is alleged that an employee, while at work, contravened a provision of this Act, or engaged in any 
conduct that, if engaged in by that employee's employer, would constitute a contravention of a provision of this 
Act, the alleged conduct must immediately be brought to the attention of the employer.'   
210 As discussed in paragraph 3.2.1 above. 
 
 54 
contravenes the provisions of POPIA for personal gain and is completely removed from 
his or her employment duties. 
 
Similarly, s 37 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act No. 85 of 1993, as amended 
("Occupational Health and Safety Act"), reads as follows: - 
 
'37.   Acts or omissions by employees or mandataries. - (1)  Whenever an employee does 
or omits to do any act which it would be an offence in terms of this Act for the employer 
of such employee or a user to do or omit to do, then, unless it is proved that – 
 
… 
 
(c) all reasonable steps were taken by the employer or any such user to prevent any act 
or omission of the kind in question, the employer or any such user himself shall be 
presumed to have done or omitted to do that act, and shall be liable to be convicted and 
sentenced in respect thereof; and the fact that he issued instructions forbidding any act 
or omission of the kind in question shall not, in itself, be accepted as sufficient proof that 
he took all reasonable steps to prevent the act or omission.' 
 
Therefore, in terms of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, the employer will be 
able to escape liability if it is able to prove that 'all reasonable steps were taken to 
prevent a contravention’ of211 the Occupational Health and Safety Act. 
 
The limited defences available to employers in terms of s 99(2) of POPIA will not 
enable the employer to avoid liability. As accurately summarised by Millard and 
Bascerano: 
 
'Unfortunately, POPI makes no distinction between the liability of a prudent employer 
and one who adopts a nonchalant approach to the duty to respect the privacy of data 
subjects. Both the virtuous and the indifferent employer are treated alike in respect of 
contraventions by their employees. Consequently, the good deeds of the virtuous 
employer seem to be of no significance. Undeniably, the law-abiding employer's good 
                                         
211 Section 37(1)(c). 
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deeds will not constitute an acceptable defence against retribution in terms of POPI.'212 
 
As it is currently phrased s 99(1) provides that any breach of POPIA or any unlawful 
infringement upon a data subject's right to privacy by an employee will result in the 
employer being held accountable, whether or not there is intent or negligence on the 
part of the employer and the few defences available to employers in terms of s 99(2) of 
POPIA will not enable the employer to avoid liability. 
 
3.4  Concluding remarks and recommendations  
 
POPIA defences to a claim based on vicarious liability in s 99(2) are not in harmony 
with the statutory defences provided for in other legislation, such as the Employment 
Equity Act. Due to the fact that POPIA is not fully operational as yet the effects of the 
lack of sufficient defences to a claim based on vicarious liability cannot be practically 
assessed at this stage.  
 
As stated by Millard and Bascerano, the only defence available to an employer would 
be to ensure that it has comprehensive liability insurance to reduce the risk of 
contraventions of POPIA by its employees.213 This will no doubt be a costly exercise.  
 
It can be accurately concluded that due to the 'legislature's short-sightedness'214 in not 
taking into consideration the fact that the employer has promoted compliance with 
POPIA and actively sought to avoid infringements of POPIA on the part of its 
employees, POPIA lacks foresight and the civil remedies as contained in sections 99(1) 
and 99(2) are excessively one sided in favour of the data subject and so adverse to the 
employer as to be discriminatory. It is difficult to discern how such incoherence 
between the statutory defences to a claim based on vicarious liability in terms of 
POPIA and those available to an employer in alternative legislation will be dealt with 
                                         
212 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 31. 
213 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 31. 
214 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 31. 
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once POPIA is fully operational.215  
 
In terms of the Constitutional Court decisions in NK v Minister of Safety and Security 
and F v Minister of Safety and Security at common law an employer could be held 
vicariously liable for an employee's wrongful conduct committed outside of the course 
and scope of the employee's employment in circumstances where the wrongful act is 
sufficiently related to conduct authorised by the employer. It would appear that the 
provisions of POPIA are not consistent with this position in that section 99(1) does not 
stipulate that the contravention of POPIA must occur ‘while at work’216 and that the 
employer will be liable ‘whether or not there is intent on the part of the responsible 
party.’217  
 
Where a data subject's privacy has been infringed the data subject will be in a position 
to base a claim against the employer, in circumstances where the infringement was 
committed by an employee of the employer, in terms of the common law right to 
privacy218 or in terms of the statutory right to privacy provided in POPIA. As correctly 
stated by Millard and Bascerano the data subject essentially has 'two roads to an 
employer's vicarious liability (one in terms of the common-law vicarious liability for 
delicts committed by an employee and the other in terms of section 99 of POPI).'219  
 
Accordingly, the data subject may claim against the employer either in terms of the 
common law doctrine of vicarious liability or in terms of s 99(1) of POPIA.220 The data 
subject may institute civil action against the employer as the responsible party in terms 
of s 99(1) of POPIA. 
 
The deciding factor for a data subject will be the fact that in terms of POPIA the 
employer will not be in a position to escape liability due to the limited defences 
                                         
215 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 30. 
216 As provided for in s 60 of the Employment Equity Act. 
217 Section 99(1) of POPIA. 
218 In terms of the common law doctrine of vicarious liability both the employee and the employer will be held 
liable even through no fault of the employers. 
219 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 15. 
220 The data subject may institute civil action against the employer as the responsible party in terms of s 99(1) of 
POPIA. 
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available to the employer in terms of s 99(2). Section 99(2) provides very limited 
defences that an employer may raise against an action brought in terms of s 99(1). 
POPIA's current position is in contrast to the position adopted by the Employment 
Equity Act and the Occupational Health Act discussed above and it is suggested that s 
99(2) be amended in order to provide for impartiality on the part of the legislature. 
 
Millard and Bascerano submit that s 99(2) should be amended as follows:  
  
'Despite subsection (1), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an employee if that 
employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that 
the employee would not act in contravention of this Act.'221 
 
It is suggested that POPIA be extended, in particular a new s 99(2)(A) be inserted,  in 
order to provide for adequate defences that may be raised by an employer against an 
action for damages. Whilst the recommendation provided by Millard and Bascerano is 
suitable, the following would provide more adequate given the approach adopted in 
foreign jurisdictions:222  
 
(2)(A) Despite subsections (1) and (2), a responsible party will be exempted from 
liability, in whole or in part, if the responsible party proves that it is not responsible for 
the event giving rise to the breach and it did all that was reasonably practicable to 
ensure compliance with this Act.' 
 
This simple addition will enable an employer to escape liability and avoid being held 
vicariously liable for contraventions of POPIA by an employee if the employer can 
prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to ensure that employees would not 
contravene the provisions of POPIA. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
221 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 32. 
222 The approach of foreign jurisdictions is analysed in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Foreign approaches with regard to vicarious liability 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the concept of an employer's statutory 
vicarious liability in respect of privacy breaches by their employees in two foreign 
jurisdictions, namely, the United Kingdom and Canada.  
 
This chapter sets out to determine whether the statutory vicarious liability provided for 
in POPIA requires modification in order to ensure international compliance in so far as 
data protection is concerned. The data protection frameworks of the United Kingdom 
and Canada will be compared to that of South Africa in order to draw lessons that may 
be useful in so far as the concept of statutory vicarious liability in respect of privacy 
breaches is concerned.   
 
The rationale behind this comparison is due to the fact that like POPIA, the data 
protection frameworks of the United Kingdom and Canada are based on the OECD223 
Guidelines. The provisions of POPIA are similar to those of the Data Protection Act 
2018 – applicable in the United Kingdom - and the United Kingdom data protection 
framework is similar to that of POPIA.  The data protection legislation in the United 
Kingdom and Canada has furthermore been in place for a longer period of time and it 
can therefore be analysed from a practical perspective as well as an academic 
perspective.  
 
4.2 United Kingdom  
 
The General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 ("GDPR") was approved by the 
European Union ("EU") Parliament on 14 April 2016 and commenced on 25 May 2018. 
The GDPR regulates data protection and privacy in the EU224 and is designed to lay 
down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
                                         
223 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental economic 
organisation with thirty six member countries. The OECD was founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress 
and world trade. 
224 Article 3 of the GDPR. 
 
 59 
personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal data and protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the 
protection of personal data.225 
 
Following the Brexit226 referendum on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom updated its 
data protection regulations to ensure that the standards set out in the GDPR have effect 
in the United Kingdom by enshrining those standards in United Kingdom law in the 
form of the Data Protection Act 2018 ("DPA 2018").  
 
The DPA 2018 is a United Kingdom Act of Parliament227 that received royal assent on 
23 May 2018. The DPA 2018 commenced on 25 May 2018, this being at the same time 
as the GDPR. Following the United Kingdom's exit from the EU228 the GDPR will no 
longer directly apply in the United Kingdom.229 
 
The DPA 2018 is essentially the United Kingdom's implementation of the GDPR230 and 
has three main purposes:  
 
a) it incorporates the GDPR into United Kingdom law; 
 
b) it repeals and replaces the Data Protection Act 1998 ("DPA 1998") as the 
primary piece of data protection legislation in the United Kingdom; and 
 
c) it ensures that the United Kingdom and EU data protection regimes will 
continue to be aligned following Brexit which will allow the UK to 
continue to be able to freely exchange personal data with the EU.231 
 
                                         
225 Article 1 of the GDPR. 
226 Brexit is an abbreviation for 'British exit' referring to the UK's decision to leave the EU.  On 29 March 2019 
the UK is scheduled to leave the EU. 
227 The DPA 2018 is a UK-specific law. 
228 See note 219. 
229 The GDPR applies in the United Kingdom until it leaves the EU. 
230 After Brexit the DPA 2018 will ensure that United Kingdom data protection legislation will be aligned with 
the GDPR. 
231 K Lamb 'UK: Introducing the Data Protection Act 2018!' (6 June 2018) available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/708140/data+protection/Introducing+The+Data+Protection+Act+2018), accessed 
on 4 October 2018. 
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4.2.1 Important definitions in the Data Protection Act 2018 
 
Section 3 of the DPA 2018 provides for the following definitions:  
 
'(2) "Personal data" means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
living individual (subject to subsection (14)(c)). 
 
(3) "Identifiable living individual" means a living individual who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to – 
 
(a)  an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data or an 
online identifier, or 
 
(b)  one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of the individual. 
 
(4) "Processing", in relation to information, means an operation or set of operations 
which is performed on information, or on sets of information, such as – 
 
(a) collection, recording, organisation, structuring or storage, 
 
(b) adaptation or alteration, 
 
(c) retrieval, consultation or use, 
 
(d)  disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
 
(d) alignment or combination, or 
 
(f)  restriction, erasure or destruction, 
 
(subject to subsection (14)(c) and sections 5(7), 29(2) and 82(3), which make 
provision about references to processing in the different Parts of this Act). 
 
(5) “Data subject” means the identified or identifiable living individual to whom 
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personal data relates.’ 
 
Section 6 of Chapter 2 of the DPA 2018 defines 'controller' as 
 
'6 Meaning of “controller” 
 
(1) The definition of “controller” in Article 4(7) of the GDPR has effect subject to - 
 
(a)  subsection (2), 
 
(b)  section 209, and 
 
(c)  section 210.' 
 
In terms of Article 4(7) of the GDPR ‘controller' means: 
 
'the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or 
jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal 
data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or 
Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be 
provided for by Union or Member State law;' 
 
In terms of Article 4(8) of the GDPR ‘processor' means: 
 
'a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller;' 
 
4.2.2 Data protection principles 
 
Chapter 2 of the DPA 2018 sets out the six data protection principles. The controller 
in relation to personal data is responsible for, and must be able to demonstrate, 
compliance with this Chapter.232 The six data protection principles are: 
 
                                         
232 Section 34(3) of the DPA 2018. 
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1) the processing of personal data for any of the law enforcement purposes 
must be lawful and fair;233  
 
2) the law enforcement purpose for which personal data is collected on any 
occasion must be specified, explicit and legitimate, and personal data so 
collected must not be processed in a manner that is incompatible with the 
purpose for which it was collected;234  
 
3) personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be 
adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which 
it is processed;235 
 
4) personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be 
accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, and every reasonable step 
must be taken to ensure that personal data that is inaccurate, having 
regard to the law enforcement purpose for which it is processed, is 
erased or rectified without delay;236  
 
5) personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be 
kept for no longer than is necessary for the purpose for which it is 
processed;237 and 
 
6) personal data processed for any of the law enforcement purposes must be 
so processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the 
personal data, using appropriate technical or organisational measures 
(and, in this principle, 'appropriate security' includes protection against 
unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, 
destruction or damage).238 
 
                                         
233 Section 35 of the DPA 2018. 
234 Section 36 of the DPA 2018. 
235 Section 37 of the DPA 2018. 
236 Section 38 of the DPA 2018. 
237 Section 39 of the DPA 2018. 
238 Section 40 of the DPA 2018. 
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The six data protection principles provided for in Chapter 2 of the DPA 2018 are 
aligned with the six data protection principles contained in Article 5 of Chapter 2 of 
the GDPR. In contrast to the DPA 2018 and the GDPR the DPA 1998 contained 
eight data protection principles. The two additional data protection principles in the 
DPA 1998 are:  
 
a) principle 6 - personal data shall be processed in accordance with the 
rights of data subjects;239 and 
 
b) principle 8 - data may only be transferred out of the European Economic 
Area if the country to which the data is being transferred has adequate 
legal protection for individuals and their details.240 
 
4.2.3  Vicarious liability 
 
Section 13 of the DPA 1998 provides for compensation for failure to comply with 
certain requirements. Section 13(3) of the DPA 1998 provides: 
 
'(3) In proceedings brought against a person by virtue of this section it is a defence to 
prove that he had taken such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably 
required to comply with the requirement concerned.' 
 
Section 55A of the DPA 1998 states: 
 
“(1) The Commissioner may serve a person with a monetary penalty if the 
Commissioner is satisfied that:  
 
(a) there has been a serious contravention of the requirements of the Privacy 
and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 by the 
person, and  
 
                                         
239 The GDPR and the DPA 2018 do not provide for an equivalent access principle, instead, access rights are 
provided for separately in s 2 of Chapter 3 of the GDPR and in s 45 of Chapter 3 of the DPA 2018.  
240 The GDPR and the DPA 2018 do not provide for an equivalent overseas transfer principle, instead, overseas 
transfer is provided for separately in Chapter 5 of the GDPR and Chapter 5 of the DPA 2018. 
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(b) subsection (2) or (3) applies. 
 
(2) This subsection applies if the contravention was deliberate. 
 
(3)  This subsection applies if the person –  
 
(a) knew or ought to have known that there was a risk that the contravention 
would occur, but  
 
(b)  failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the contravention.' 
 
Article 23241 of the EU Directive 95/46/EC242 states that:  
 
'1. Member States shall provide that any person who has suffered damage as a result 
of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the national 
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive compensation from 
the controller for the damage suffered. 
 
2. The controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if he proves 
that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.' 
 
Similarly s 169 of the DPA 2018 provides: 
 
'169 Compensation for contravention of other data protection legislation 
 
(1) A person who suffers damage by reason of a contravention of a requirement of the 
data protection legislation, other than the GDPR, is entitled to compensation for that 
damage from the controller or the processor, subject to subsections (2) and (3). 
 
(2) Under subsection (1) – 
 
                                         
241 Chapter III Judicial Remedies, Liability and Sanctions. 
242 European Union (EU) Directive No. 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data. 
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(a)  a controller involved in processing of personal data is liable for any damage 
caused by the processing, and 
 
(b)  a processor involved in processing of personal data is liable for damage 
caused by the processing only if the processor – 
 
(i)  has not complied with an obligation under the data protection legislation 
specifically directed at processors, or 
 
(ii)  has acted outside, or contrary to, the controller’s lawful instructions. 
 
(3) A controller or processor is not liable as described in subsection (2) if the 
controller or processor proves that the controller or processor is not in any way 
responsible for the event giving rise to the damage. 
 
…' 
 
The exemption provided to employers in s 169(3) of the DPA 2018 is narrower than 
the exemption provided in Article 23(2) of the EU Directive 95/46/EC. 
 
Recital 55 of the EU Directive 95/46/EC states: 
 
'Whereas, if the controller fails to respect the rights of data subjects, national 
legislation must provide for a judicial remedy; whereas any damage which a person 
may suffer as a result of unlawful processing must be compensated for by the 
controller, who may be exempted from liability if he proves that he is not responsible 
for the damage, in particular in cases where he establishes fault on the part of the 
data subject or in case of force majeure; whereas sanctions must be imposed on any 
person, whether governed by private of public law, who fails to comply with the 
national measures taken under this Directive;' 
 
It is evident in s 13(3) of the DPA 1998, s 55A of the DPA 1998, Article 23 of the 
EU Directive 95/46/EC, s 169(3) of the DPA 2018 and Recital 55 of the EU 
Directive 95/46/EC that an employer is exempt from liability in circumstances 
where the employer is able to show that it took reasonable measures to prevent any 
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the contravention of the legislation.  
 
As previously alluded to, POPIA contains no such mechanism for an employer to 
escape liability even in circumstances where an employer is able to show that it 
reasonable steps to prevent the contravention of POPIA. 
 
4.2.4 Case law 
 
 Due to the fact that the DPA 2018 is a relatively new piece of legislation it is yet to 
be practically assessed before British courts. However, a landmark ruling was 
handed down in the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of Justice on 1 
December 2017 in the case of Various Claimants v WM Morrisons Supermarket 
Plc.243 In this group action 5 518 employees ("claimants") of Morrisons Supermarket 
PLC ("Morrisons") sued Morrisons and claimed compensation for breach of 
statutory duty in terms of s 4(4) of the DPA 1998 and at common law for the misuse 
of private information and breach of confidence.  
 
 This case concerned the disclosure of personal data of a large number of employees 
of Morrisons by a rogue employee (“Skelton”), being a senior IT internal auditor of 
Morrisons.  Skelton posted a file containing the personal information of the 
employees on a file sharing website. The personal information posted by Skelton 
contained information such as names, addresses, gender, dates of birth, phone 
numbers, national insurance numbers, bank codes and account numbers as well as 
salaries. 
 
                                         
243 Various Claimants v WM Morrisons Supermarket Plc (Rev 1) [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) ("Various 
Claimants v WM Morrisons"). 
 
 67 
The claimants claimed that Morrisons had primary liability for its own acts or 
omissions, and vicarious liability for the actions of one of its employees. The 
claimants claimed a breach of the principles of the DPA 1998, in particular data 
protection principle 1 which requires the consent of a data subject244 to the 
processing245 of its personal data.246 The claimants did not consent to the processing 
of their personal data by Skelton.   
 
The claimants further claimed a breach of the data protection principles referred to 
in s 4 of the DPA 1998 and contained in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the DPA 1998. The 
claimants stated that in terms of s 4(4) of the DPA, which reads as follows: - 
 
'(4) Subject to section 27(1), it shall be the duty of the data controller to comply with 
the data protection principles in relation to all personal data with respect to which he 
is the data controller.' 
 
Morrisons was at all relevant times the data controller247 in respect of the payroll 
data abstracted and transferred to Skelton and that it failed to comply with data 
protection principles 1,248 2,249 3,250 5251 and 7.252 
 
                                         
244 In terms of s 1 of the DPA, 1998 'data subject' means an individual who is the subject of personal data. 
245 In terms of s 1 of the DPA 1998 'processing' in relation to information or data, means: 
'obtaining, recording or holding the information or data or carrying out any operation or set of operations on 
the information or data, including—  
(a) organisation, adaptation or alteration of the information or data,  
(b) retrieval, consultation or use of the information or data,  
(c) disclosure of the information or data by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, or  
(d) alignment, combination, blocking, erasure or destruction of the information or data; 
246 In terms of s 1 of the DPA 1998 'personal data' means 'data which relate to a living individual who can be 
identified -  
(a) from those data, or  
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession 
of, the data controller,  
and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the data 
controller or any other person in respect of the individual.' 
247 In terms of s 1 of the DPA 1998 'data controller' means, 'subject to subsection (4), a person who (either 
alone or jointly or in common with other persons) determines the purposes for which and the manner in which 
any personal data are, or are to be, processed.' 
248 In terms of data protection principle 1 personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully. 
249 In terms of data protection principle 2 personal data must be processed for specified lawful purposes. 
250 In terms of data protection principle 3 personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive. 
251 Data protection principle 5 requires that personal data is not to be kept for longer than is necessary. 
252 Data protection principle 7 requires that personal data must be kept secure. 
 
 68 
The court held that Morrisons could not be held directly liable for the breach of the 
DPA 1998 data protection principles due to the fact that it was not the data controller 
at the time when the first, second, third and fifth data protection principles were 
breached. The misuse and processing of the data were those of Skelton, and not 
Morrisons.253 It was Skelton, acting without authority as an independent data 
controller that disclosed the personal data of the claimants. The only duty Morrisons 
owed the claimants was in terms of the seventh data protection principle which 
requires the data controller to take appropriate measures to protect personal data 
against unlawful processing. 
 
The court identified at paragraph [73] six respects in which the claimants alleged 
that Morrisons fell short of its obligations under data protection principle 7 while it 
was the data controller. These are summarised by Langstaff J as follows:  
 
'These contentions became six issues: whether Morrisons fell short of their 
obligations under DPP7 by: -  
  
a) failing to manage/mentor Skelton “to prevent a grudge developing”;  
 
b) failing to monitor the email “quarantine” area so as to identify that the data was 
being transferred to Skelton;  
 
c) failing to identify that Skelton was researching the “TOR” network;  
 
d)  failing to deny Skelton access to the data;  
 
e) providing the data to Skelton via USB stick which it was alleged was not 
encrypted; and  
 
f)  failing to ensure that Skelton deleted the payroll data (in the particulars of claim, 
the Claimants asserted it ought to have been effective on or about 21st 
November).' 
 
                                         
253 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 47. 
 
 69 
The court held that Morrisons had taken the appropriate measures to protect the 
claimants' data against misuse. Morrisons had put in place security systems which 
were generally considered by the court to be adequate and appropriate. Surprisingly, 
Langstaff J went on to hold as follows: 
 
'I cannot, however, construe either the Directive or the Act as requiring a data 
controller to be responsible even without fault for the subsequent disclosure by a 
third party of some of the information given to it.'254 
 
The court held that 'there was an unbroken thread that linked his work to the 
disclosure: what happened was a seamless and continuous sequence of events.'255 
 
Langstaff J held as follows: 
 
'… it is notable that Lord Toulson explained those cases in which liability had been 
upheld as being those where the employee misused his position in a way which 
injured the claimant, and that it was just that the employer who selected him and put 
him in that position should be held responsible …. I would add to his exposition only 
that the employer, too, had at least the theoretical right to control. Though employers 
can hardly tell highly skilled workers the detail of how to do their jobs, it remains a 
necessary element in every contract of employment that the employer has “…lawful 
authority to command so far as there is scope for it. and there must always be some 
room for it, if only in incidental or collateral matters" (Zuijs v. Wirth Brothers 
Proprietary, Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 561, 571, cited by McKenna J. in Ready-Mixed 
Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497): 
nowadays perhaps best rendered as a directory power.'256 
 
The court relied on the judgment in the case of Catholic Child Welfare Society257 
wherein Lord Phillips held: - 
 
'The relationship that gives rise to vicarious liability is in the vast majority of cases 
                                         
254 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 57. 
255 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 183. 
256 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 192. 
257 The Catholic Child Welfare Society and others (Appellants) v Various Claimants and The Institute of the 
Brothers of the Christian Schools (Respondents) [2012] UKSC 56. 
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that of employer and employee under a contract of employment. The employer will be 
vicariously liable when the employee commits a tort in the course of his employment. 
There is no difficulty in identifying a number of policy reasons that usually make it 
fair, just and reasonable to impose vicarious liability on the employer when these 
criteria are satisfied: i) The employer is more likely to have the means to compensate 
the victim than the employee and can be expected to have insured against that 
liability; ii) The tort will have been committed as a result of activity being taken by 
the employee on behalf of the employer; iii) The employee's activity is likely to be part 
of the business activity of the employer; iv) The employer, by employing the employee 
to carry on the activity will have created the risk of the tort committed by the 
employee; v) The employee will, to a greater or lesser degree, have been under the 
control of the employer.' 258 
 
In response to the factors set out by Lord Phillips above the court held as follows:  
 
'The factors identified in Catholic Child Welfare Society are typically true of 
relationships of employee and employer, which was what was addressed in paragraph 
35 of the judgment of Lord Phillips. They are true here too, where the context is not 
relationship but course of employment: Morrisons are more likely to have the means 
to compensate the victim than Skelton and can be expected to have insured against 
that liability, even if breaches of data security may not historically have been a 
mainstream risk; it follows from my finding above (ii) that the tort was committed as 
a result of activity being taken by the employee on behalf of the employer – in the 
sense of his being chosen to handle the data, with a view to the employer’s interests in 
completing an audit, such that Skelton’s employee activity – viewed broadly – can be 
seen as part of the business activity of the employee, even though he chose to abuse 
his position. As to (iv), the employer, by employing the employee to carry on the 
activity, created the risk of the tort committed by the employee; and v) Skelton was, to 
a greater or lesser degree, under the control of the employer, at least in the sense 
described in the last paragraph above.'259 
 
Langstaff J held that the principles of vicarious liability apply to the DPA 1998. The 
aim of the DPA 1998 is the protection of data subjects and accordingly if an 
                                         
258 The Catholic Child Welfare Society and others (Appellants) v Various Claimants and The Institute of the 
Brothers of the Christian Schools (Respondents) [2012] UKSC 56 at paragraph 35. 
259 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 193. 
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employer can escape liability the moment an employee decides to misuse data to 
which his employer has given him access, this would defeat the purpose of the DPA 
1998.260 
 
The 'course of employment' test for vicarious liability should be applied broadly. The 
court found that there was a sufficient connection between Skelton's employment 
and his wrongful conduct for vicarious liability to be established. This was despite 
the disconnect in time, place and nature from Skelton's employment when he posted 
the data. 
 
The High Court held that Morrisons was vicariously liable for the actions of Skelton 
on the basis of vicarious liability. This case is the first successful class action for a 
data breach in the United Kingdom. 
 
In concluding, Langstaff J stated: 
 
'The point which most troubled me in reaching these conclusions was the submission 
that the wrongful acts of Skelton were deliberately aimed at the party whom the 
claimants seek to hold responsible, such that to reach the conclusion I have may seem 
to render the court an accessory in furthering his criminal aims. I grant leave to 
Morrisons to appeal my conclusion as to vicarious liability, should they wish to do so, 
so that a higher court may consider it: but would not, without further persuasion, 
grant permission to cross-appeal my conclusions as to primary liability.'261 
 
Morrisons subsequently appealed the order of Langstaff J dated 1 November 2017 
and the appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) before Lord Justice 
Bean and Lord Justice Flaux on 9 and 10 October 2018.262 Judgment was handed 
down on 22 October 2018. 
 
                                         
260 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 154. 
261 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 198. 
262 Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC [2018] EWCA Civ 2239. 
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The appeal concerned whether Langstaff J was correct in deciding that Morrisons is 
vicariously liable to the claimants for the actions of Mr Skelton. The appeal court 
held: 
 
'The common law principle of vicarious liability is not confined to common law 
wrongs. It holds good for a wrong comprising a breach of statutory duty provided the 
statute does not expressly or impliedly indicate otherwise: Majrowski v Guy’s and St 
Thomas’s NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34, [2007] 1 AC 224 at [10] Lord Nicholls). The 
DPA does indicate the contrary. Pursuant to the Directive, the DPA seeks to achieve 
a balance between the right to privacy and the free flow of personal data from one 
member state to another in the interests of economic and social progress. It imposes 
express obligations on the data controller, primarily the obligation under section 4(4) 
to comply with the DPP. In accordance with ordinary principles of EU jurisprudence, 
those obligations are to be interpreted as proportionate ones. They are in any event 
expressly qualified in important respects by reference to what is appropriate or 
reasonable. So, DPP 7 requires that “appropriate” technical and organisational 
measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal 
data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.263 
 
What is “appropriate” is related to the state of technological development and the 
cost of implementing any measures as well as the harm that might result from 
unauthorised or unlawful processing or accidental loss, destruction or damage, and 
the nature of the data to be protected: Schedule 1 Part II para. 9. Importantly, under 
DPP 7 the data controller must take “reasonable steps” to ensure the reliability of 
any employees of his who have access to the personal data: Schedule 1 Part II para. 
10. The DPA, therefore, expressly recognises the potential liability of a data 
controller for the wrongful processing of data by his employees. Instead, however, of 
imposing a vicarious liability, which is a strict liability irrespective of the employer’s 
fault, it imposes a primary liability on the employer restricted to taking “reasonable 
steps” to ensure the reliability of the relevant employees. Further, section 13(3) 
provides that it is a defence to an action by an individual for compensation from the 
data controller for breach of any of the requirements of the DPA that the data 
controller has taken such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably required to 
comply with the requirement concerned. In effect, so far as concerns civil liability, the 
                                         
263 Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC [2018] EWCA Civ 2239 at paragraph 40. 
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liability is based on fault or culpability: cf. criminal liability under section 55 of the 
DPA.'264 
 
The appeal court did not accept that 'there is an exception to the irrelevance of 
motive where the motive is, by causing harm to a third party, to cause financial or 
reputational damage to the employer.'265  
 
The appeal court agreed with Langstaff J and held that Morrisons was vicariously 
liable for the wrongful act committed by Mr Skelton against the claimants. The 
appeal was dismissed. In its concluding remarks the appeal court held: 
 
'There have been many instances reported in the media in recent years of data 
breaches on a massive scale caused by either corporate system failures or negligence 
by individuals acting in the course of their employment. These might, depending on 
the facts, lead to a large number of claims against the relevant company for 
potentially ruinous amounts. The solution is to insure against such catastrophes; and 
employers can likewise insure against losses caused by dishonest or malicious 
employees.'266 
 
The Court of Appeal refused Morrisons leave to appeal but it is understood that 
Morrisons will seek leave to appeal from the Supreme Court. 
 
4.3 Canada 
 
In Canada there are currently 38 separate statutes267 regulating the collection and use of 
personal information. Statutory causes of action are provided by way of the following 
statutes: 
 
1) Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, ch. 5 
                                         
264 Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC [2018] EWCA Civ 2239 at paragraph 41. 
265 Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC [2018] EWCA Civ 2239 at paragraph 76. 
266 Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC [2018] EWCA Civ 2239 at paragraph 78. 
267 E Dolden … et al. 'Current landscape of personal information and privacy liability in Canada' (February 
2016) Dolden Wallace Folick LLP available at http://www.dolden.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/166-
Current-Landscape-of-Personal-Information-and-Privacy-in-Canada-February-2016.pdf, accessed on 4 
October 2018. 
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("PIPEDA") or the equivalent substantially similar provincial acts;  
 
2) Privacy Act right of action for breach of privacy available in four provinces;268 or  
 
3) Canada's Anti-Spam Law.269 
 
PIPEDA is the Canadian federal legislation regulating the private sector organisations 
in certain provinces. PIPEDA adopted the CSA International Privacy Code, being a 
national standard developed in conjunction with the private sector and based on the 
OECD principles, into law for the private sector. PIPEDA defines personal information 
as 'information about an identifiable individual.'270  
 
In Canada every province and territory has its own laws that apply to provincial and 
territorial government agencies and their handling of personal information. Some 
provinces have private-sector privacy laws that have been deemed 'substantially 
similar' to PIPEDA. This means that those substantially similar laws apply to the 
particular province instead of PIPEDA. These provinces are Alberta, British Columbia 
and Quebec. 
 
Section 3 of the PIPEDA states that the purpose of the PIPEDA is:  
 
'The purpose of this Part is to establish, in an era in which technology increasingly 
facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to govern the collection, 
use and disclosure of personal information in a manner that recognizes the right of 
privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information and the need of 
organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information for purposes that a 
reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances.' 
 
For the purposes of this study the British Columbia Privacy Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 
373, will be analysed and discussed. Section 1 of the Privacy Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 
                                         
268 These four provinces are British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan. 
269 E Dolden … et al. 'Current landscape of personal information and privacy liability in Canada' (February 
2016) available at http://www.dolden.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/166-Current-Landscape-of-Personal-
Information-and-Privacy-in-Canada-February-2016.pdf, accessed on 4 October 2018. 
270 Section 2(1) of PIPEDA. 
 
 75 
373, creates the statutory tort of violation of privacy.271 It reads:  
 
'Violation of privacy actionable 
 
1 (1)  It is a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, wilfully and without 
a claim of right, to violate the privacy of another.  
 
(2) The nature and degree of privacy to which a person is entitled in a situation or in 
relation to a matter is that which is reasonable in the circumstances, giving due 
regard to the lawful interests of others.  
 
(3)  In determining whether the act or conduct of a person is a violation of another’s 
privacy, regard must be given to the nature, incidence and occasion of the act or 
conduct and to any domestic or other relationship between the parties.' 
 
Ultimately s 1 of the Privacy Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 373, requires that the act 
leading to the breach of privacy be intentional, and proof of economic loss or other 
specific harm is not a pre-requisite for liability or damages.272 Therefore a person 
whose privacy is breached in British Columbia has a right to sue only if the breach 
meets the elements of the statutory tort set out in the Act. While persons will not have 
to prove that they have suffered harm as a result of the breach, they will have to prove 
that the breach was wilful, without claim or right, and violated their reasonable privacy 
expectations. 
 
In Ari v Insurance Corporation of British Columbia 2015 BCCA 468 ("Ari") the Court 
of Appeal for British Columbia was tasked with deciding whether certain portions of a 
proposed class action ought to have been struck. The plaintiff in this matter alleged, 
inter alia, that an employee of the defendant breached common law and statutory rights 
to privacy by improperly accessing the personal information held by the Insurance 
Corporation of British Columbia. The plaintiff sought to hold the Insurance 
Corporation of British Columbia vicariously liable for its employee’s misconduct and 
                                         
271 E Dolden … et al. 'Current landscape of personal information and privacy liability in Canada' (February 
2016) available at http://www.dolden.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/166-Current-Landscape-of-Personal-
Information-and-Privacy-in-Canada-February-2016.pdf, accessed on 4 October 2018. 
272 Section 1 of the Privacy Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 373. 
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alleged breach of the Privacy Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 373.  
 
The Insurance Corporation of British Columbia contended that s 1 of the Privacy Act 
[RSBC 1996] Chapter 373 does not permit it to be held liable for its employees 
wrongdoing.   The Court of Appeal held that the Privacy Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 
373, did not exclude the imposition of vicarious liability on the employer and suggested 
that the principles of vicarious liability may be applied in the context of a breach of 
privacy by an employee just as they would to any other wrongful act of an employee. 
 
The Court of Appeal did not evaluate the matter on its merits and the dispute essentially 
revolved around considering the test for striking out of pleadings. The matter therefore 
did not definitively answer the question of whether and when an employer is 
vicariously liable for the privacy breaches of its employees and the court stated that it 
was necessary for it to receive evidence in order to fairly address whether Insurance 
Corporation of British Columbia could be held vicariously liable.   
 
The Court of Appeal provided the following reasons for its decision: 
 
'[25]  It is not clear that s. 1 of the Privacy Act should be interpreted as limited in the 
same fashion as the relevant provisions in Nelson. Section 1(1) states that “[i]t is 
a tort, actionable without proof of damage, for a person, wilfully and without a 
claim of right, to violate the privacy of another”. There is no language (as there 
was in Nelson) that clearly limits a plaintiff to recovery of damages from the 
person identified in s. 1(1). While, as the chambers judge observed, vicarious 
liability for acts of intentional and deliberate wrongdoing has generally been 
rejected, it is not unheard of (see: Lewis Klar, Tort Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2012) at 682). To the extent that s. 1(1) of the Privacy Act requires 
deliberate wrongdoing, it is not per se incompatible with vicarious liability. 
 
[26]     Although Nelson may provide, by analogy, a basis for denying the availability of 
vicarious liability, I cannot conclude that the chambers judge erred in finding the 
appellant’s claim is on this basis, not bound to fail. 
 
[27]     Alternatively, ICBC says that there is a policy argument which supports its 
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position that there is no cause of action in vicarious liability. For policy reasons 
ICBC says, employers should not be held vicariously liable for wilful breaches of 
privacy under the Privacy Act. 
 
[28]     ICBC also contends that the question before the chambers judge was whether 
vicarious liability should be imposed due to policy considerations. It says that the 
appropriate question to ask is: should liability lie against a public body for the 
wrongful conduct of its employee, in these circumstances? The question 
necessarily demands some exploration of the evidence about the connection 
between ICBC’s security procedures and the security lapse that occurred, as well 
as a weighing of the policy considerations involved. It is reasonable to conclude 
that a factual matrix is necessary in order to fairly address whether ICBC’s 
conduct materially enhanced the possibility of committing the breach of privacy, 
and to determine the connection between the impugned conduct and ICBC’s 
conduct. In other words, to clearly determine how public policy considerations 
affect the viability of the vicarious liability claim, some evidence is required.'273 
 
This is the only Canadian decision which has considered whether an employer can be 
vicariously liable for a breach of the Privacy Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 373274 and due 
to the fact that the matter is still pending it can be submitted that Canadian courts have 
not directly decided whether vicarious liability may be extended to employers in 
respect of the privacy breaches of their employees.275 
 
It would however seem that the decision in the Ari case is consistent with the recent 
decision in the United Kingdom in Various Claimants v WM Morrisons which holds 
that the test for vicarious liability of an employer for the wrongful acts of its employees 
is the same as it is for any other wrongful act of an employee. 
 
                                         
273 Ari v Insurance Corporation of British Columbia 2015 BCCA 468 paragraphs 25 to 28. 
274 K Zimmer 'Canada: Privacy Breach By Your Rogue Employee: Are You Liable?' (26 September 2018) 
available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/739684/Data+Protection+Privacy/Privacy+breach+by+your+rogue+employe
e+Are+you+liable, accessed on 4 October 2018. 
275 K Zimmer 'Canada: Privacy Breach By Your Rogue Employee: Are You Liable?' (26 September 2018) 
available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/739684/Data+Protection+Privacy/Privacy+breach+by+your+rogue+employe
e+Are+you+liable, accessed on 4 October 2018. 
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4.4  Concluding remarks 
 
The ultimate decision of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Various Claimants 
v WM Morrisons effectively achieved Mr Skelton's motive of punishing Morrisons by 
making it liable to its employees through no fault of its own.276 This seems harsh in the 
circumstances especially given the fact that Langstaff J held that Morrisons had taken 
the appropriate measures to protect the claimants' data against misuse.277 
 
Although British and Canadian legislation provides for a mechanism for employers to 
escape vicarious liability in circumstances where its employees breaches the provisions 
of the relevant legislation, when practically implemented it would seem that the courts 
have been inclined to hold the employers vicariously liable for such unlawful conducts 
on the part of its employees notwithstanding that they have taken appropriate steps to 
mitigate the risk of unlawful conduct occurring. 
 
This is set to have far reaching consequences as employers are exposed to potential 
claims arising from the misuse of personal data by employees, even in circumstances 
where the employee has deliberately set out to harm the employer. 
 
If the case of Various Claimants v WM Morrisons is to be followed an employer cannot 
evade liability by demonstrating that it implemented appropriate measures in 
accordance with data protection legislation. It would follow that the only option 
available to employers is to provide appropriate liability insurance against the risk of 
contraventions of data protection legislation by its employees.278 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
276 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 198. 
277 Various Claimants v Wm Morrisons Supermarket PLC [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB) 2017 at paragraph 82. 
278 See Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC [2018] EWCA Civ 2239 at paragraph 78 and D 
Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 31. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
 
5.1 Overview 
 
'Worldwide, the ever-increasing surge of technology has brought with it a myriad of 
legal problems. South Africa is not immune to these.'279 
 
The motivation behind the analysis of POPIA is due to the fact that 2018 has marked a 
landmark year for data protection globally.280 Rapid technological advancement has 
drastically increased the necessity for adequate data protection legislation in order to 
regulate the processing and dissemination of personal information. 
 
The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to draw a conclusion as to the effect that 
statutory vicarious liability as created in terms of POPIA will have on employers, and 
to provide recommendations for the way forward by drawing and deriving measures 
from those adopted by foreign jurisdictions. 
 
As precisely encapsulated by Britz: 
 
'We are currently living in the so-called information age which can be described as an 
era were economic activities are mainly information based (an age of 
informationalization). This is due to the development and use of technology.'281 
 
The adoption of the GDPR and the DPA 2018 on 25 May 2018 provides a clear 
indication of how data legislation is continually responding to shifts in the 
technological landscape and is symbolic of how the technological world has 
fundamentally changed. In South Africa, POPIA delivers an essential framework in 
how responsible parties are to handle personal data and it clearly establishes data 
protection conditions that set out the minimum requirements for the processing of 
                                         
279 D van der Merwe 'Introduction' in D P van der Merwe… et al (2ed) Information and Communications 
Technology Law (2016) 1. 
280 See for example the enactment of the EU GDPR and the United Kingdom DPA 2018. 
281 J.J Britz 'Technology as a threat to privacy: ethical challenges to the information profession' (1996) 13(3) 
Microcomputers for Information Management: Global Internetworking for Libraries available at 
http://web.simmons.edu/~chen/nit/NIT%2796/96-025-Britz.html, accessed on 4 September 2018. 
 
 80 
personal information. As technology has evolved the potential risk to privacy has 
grown.  It is therefore essential that POPIA fulfils its mandate to safeguard the 
fundamental right to privacy as enshrined in the Constitution.  
 
Various Claimants v WM Morrisons has increased public awareness of data protection 
issues worldwide as it highlights the wide reach of data protection. As it currently 
stands an employer can be liable for data breaches on the part of their employees even 
if the employer has taken appropriate measures to comply with the data protection 
legislation. Due to the fact that s 99(2) does not provide adequate defences282 for an 
employer to evade liability for breaches of POPIA on the part of their employees, it 
would follow that POPIA will be faced with similar difficulties once fully operational. 
 
5.2  Observation  
 
The doctrine of vicarious liability provides an incentive to employers to exercise care in 
the selection, hiring, training and supervision of employees in order to prevent unlawful 
conduct on the part of their employees.283 It is therefore comprehensible that an 
employer should evade liability in circumstances where the employer has eagerly 
exercised reasonable care and encouraged compliance with POPIA. O'Regan J 
corroborates this view by stating:  
 
'There is a countervailing principle too, which is that damages should not be borne by 
employers in all circumstances, but only in those circumstances in which it is fair to 
require them to do so.'284 
 
The provisions of the Employment Equity Act and the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act expressly provide alleviation to employers that can prove that they did all that was 
                                         
282 Section 99(2) of POPIA does not provide an exemption to employers, being responsible parties that have 
taken reasonable measures to comply with POPIA. 
283 See O'Regan J in NK v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] ZACC 8; 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) 
BCLR 835 (CC) at 21: 
'The rationale for vicarious liability is to be found in a range of underlying principles. An important one is the 
desirability of affording claimants efficacious remedies for harm suffered. Another is the need to use legal 
remedies to incite employers to take active steps to prevent their employees from harming members of the 
broader community.' 
284 NK v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] ZACC 8; 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) at 
21. 
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reasonably practicable to ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of the 
relevant legislation.285  This relief is mirrored in the provisions of the GDPR, the DPA 
1998, the DPA 2018 and the British Columbia Privacy Act [RSBC 1996] Chapter 
373.286 
 
It would appear that the South African courts have expressed the view287 that employers 
that take all reasonable steps to prevent any unlawful act or omission on the part of 
their employees should not be held liable for any unlawful act or omission caused by 
their employees, however, the legislature seem to have overlooked this important 
provision when drafting POPIA, in particular s 99.  
 
In terms of POPIA where an employee infringes a data subjects right to privacy and 
thereby breaches the provisions of POPIA, the employer will be held liable, whether or 
not there is negligence on the part of the employer.288 The employer's liability extends 
to circumstances where the employee has purposely and maliciously sets out to harm 
the employer, has acted for their own gain, and has acted outside the course and scope 
of their employment.289 Section 99(2) of POPIA does not enable an employer to escape 
being held vicariously liable even in circumstances where the employer is able to prove 
that it proactively took all reasonable and practicable steps to prevent a contravention of 
POPIA. 
 
Although Various Claimants v WM Morrisons concerned data breaches that occurred 
prior to the application of the GDPR and the DPA 2018, the GDPR and the DPA 2018 
expressly provide290 that any person who has suffered material or non-material damage 
as a result of an infringement of the relevant legislation shall have the right to receive 
compensation for the damage suffered. Similarly, s 99(3)(a) of POPIA empowers the 
court to award payment of damages as compensation for patrimonial and non-
                                         
285 Section 60(4) of the Employment Equity Act and s 37 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act. 
286 As analysed in chapter 4 of this study. 
287 See O'Regan J in NK v Minister of Safety and Security [2005] ZACC 8; 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC); 2005 (9) 
BCLR 835 (CC) at 21: 
'There is a countervailing principle too, which is that damages should not be borne by employers in all 
circumstances, but only in those circumstances in which it is fair to require them to do so.' 
288 Section 99(1) of POPIA. 
289 See POPIA s 99(2) defences against an action for damages. 
290 Article 82 of the GDPR and s 169 of the DPA 2018. 
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patrimonial loss suffered by a data subject as a result of breach of the provisions of 
POPIA. These provisions will make it even easier for individuals to succeed with 
claims based on vicarious liability. 
 
With numerous high profile data breaches having taken place in 2018, it will be 
interesting to see how the South African judiciary will deal with claims based on 
statutory vicarious liability in terms of POPIA once it is fully operational and whether 
or not the legislature will be inclined to amend s 99 of POPIA to bring it in line with 
the Employment Equity Act, the Occupational Health and Safety Act and foreign 
legislation in order to 'alleviate the plight of the employer without compromising any of 
the all-important objectives.'291 
 
5.3 Conclusion and recommendation 
 
As accurately expressed by Roos: 
 
'All in all the Act is an excellent piece of legislation and it is hoped that it will become 
fully operative soon.'292 
 
In light of the above it can be concluded that POPIA is a comprehensive and effective 
piece of legislation that aligns South African data protection to international standards 
and gives effect to the constitutional right to privacy by safeguarding personal 
information. 
 
Section 99 of POPIA does however require some further consideration by the 
legislature as once POPIA is fully operational s 99 could be problematic and be deemed 
to be excessively one sided in favour of data subjects. The full impact of s 99 can only 
be thoroughly analysed once practically implemented and therefore the effective date 
for full promulgation of POPIA is eagerly anticipated. 
 
                                         
291 D Millard & EG Bascerano 'Employers' statutory vicarious liability in terms of the Protection of Personal 
Information Act' (2016) 19(1) PELJ 32. 
292 A Roos 'Data Privacy Law' in D P van der Merwe… et al (2ed) Information and Communications 
Technology Law (2016) 478. 
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As submitted earlier in this study a new subsection, s 99(2)(A), should be inserted to 
include the following, namely:  
 
(2)(A) Despite subsections (1) and (2), a responsible party will be exempted from 
liability, in whole or in part, if the responsible party proves that it is not responsible for 
the event giving rise to the breach and it did all that was reasonably practicable to 
ensure compliance with this Act. 
 
This insertion will provide adequate relief to employers that have done all that was 
reasonably practicable to ensure compliance with POPIA. This clause extends and goes 
further than that suggested by Millard and Bascerano in that it provides exemption from 
liability in circumstances where the employer was not responsible for the relevant 
breach of the provisions of POPIA. This straightforward addition will eliminate 
uncertainty that may arise in circumstances such as those presented in Various 
Claimants v WM Morrisons whereby an employee deliberately and maliciously sets out 
to harm the employer by breaching the provisions of POPIA 
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